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SANAL MİZAH
ÖZDEMİR, Nebi
MOHAMMADZADEH, Behbood
KUZEY KIBRIS/NORTH CYPRUS/СЕВЕРНЫЙ КИПР
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the cultural and social implications which exist in
The God of Small Things written by Indian postcolonial writer Arundhati
Roy. The study analyzes Roy’s work according to the postcolonial theory and
gives importance to the premises of main theorist in this field. Postcolonial
literary texts like Roy’s are rewritings of colonial and postcolonial
images. Roy’s protagonists Rahel and Estha grow up in a village in Kerala
influenced with Elvis Presley, Broadway musicals, peppermint candies,
Love-in-Tokyo hair bands, Rhodes scholarships, Chinese Marxism, and
Syrian Christianity. Most of these cultural images are foreign, yet all of
these are their own. Thus, while in one sense these children, as Roy’s hybrid
characters, are Malayalam, in another sense they are not. This turmoil of
identification forms the basis of the plot, the children aren’t certain who or
what they are.
Key Words: Postcolonial Literature, cultural and social implications,
colonial and postcolonial images, hybrid identities.
The history of colonialism began in the 15th century with the age of
discovery, led by Spanish and Portuguese explorations of Americas and
other continents, but, in the eighteens century Europe, the advent of the
Industrial Revolution led to great changes in the industrial transformation
of economies and an enormous development in the traditional trade.
European countries in order to provide themselves with raw materials
and markets for their goods colonized many non-European countries.
Europeans on behalf of colonialism making their way to non-European
countries came in contact with the non-European landscape and nation.
Identifying with Eurocentrism let them to observe themselves as superior
and the colonized and their land as inferior and uncivilized. Consequently,
they tried to transform the colonized landscape into the civilized countries
similar to home country. In spite of this fact that European regarded
themselves superior to the non-European countries in all aspects, and aimed
at turning this inferior land into civilized one, the deep understanding and
close interaction always resulted in a deep fear for the colonizers.
The colonizers preoccupied by the possibility of being contaminated
on account of deep interaction with these uncivilized people were always
afraid of this interaction, thereby leaving behind their purity and superiority
over the colonized, as a result, the colonizer always regarded the interaction
with the colonized as a threat and they camouflaged their fear every time.
The deep interaction between the colonizer and the colonized despite
being a menace to the colonizer had another impact on the colonized which
resulted in losing self respect and devaluing image of themselves among
this people. Thus, the oppressed people, uprooted from their own selves,
struggled to become a member of another culture.
During the colonial period written text favored the Europeans and
their superiority over the non-Europeans. It was the system of power that
determines the representations. Terry Goldie maintains that “the indigene is
a semiotic pawn on a chess board under the control of the white signmaker”
(Goldie ). Thus, in oriental discourse the Europeans were
portrayed as “masculine”, “democrat”, “rational”, “moral”, “dynamic”, and
“progressive”. Otherwise, since the writing was under the direct control of
the Europeans the non-Europeans were described as “voiceless”, “sensual”,
“female”, “despotic”, “irrational”, and “backward”. Colonial discourse
never depicted the anxiety and the suffering of the colonial stemmed from
the underestimated image of themselves. Throughout the colonial period
and the aftermath, the west had cultural and economic hegemony over the
non-Europeans through orientalists discourse. According to Bill Ashcroft
the colonizers who believed themselves as “a high level of civilization”,
fabricated the colonized lands in colonial discourse as “civilizations in
decay, as manifestations of degenerate societies and races in need of rescue
and rehabilitations by a civilized Europe” (Ashcraft, ). Upon
settling down, therefore, the colonizers desired to bring the best of their
country to the colonized territory, and to change this native country to a
civilized one. Colonial discourse fabricating the native cultures as both
primitive and degenerate was because fearing of contamination amongst
the colonizers. Bill Ashcraft highlights that “expressed through a fear
amongst the colonizers of going native, namely losing their distinctiveness
two children Ammu and Chacko. Ammu their daughter several years after
their arrival experience an unhappy marriage with a Hindu man, which
end in divorce. Ammu after divorce comes back to her parental house with
her twin, Estha and Rahel. Ammu and her twin begin to live in Ayemenem
with Mammachi, Chacko, and their aunt, Aunt Baby. Chacko Pappachi,
family’s son is sent to Oxford to continue his education, where he meets
his future English wife Margaret but their marriage ends in divorce in the
same year, then, Chacko leaving Margaret and his daughter Sophie Mol, in
England, comes back to Ayemenem to his father’s home.
Roy’s story revolves around the events surrounding the visit made by
Sophie Mol Chacko’s daughter and his ex-wife Margaret and the drowning
of Sophie two weeks after their arrival, leaving behind a disintegrated
family. The family’s suffering from Sophie Mole’s drowning become great
when Ammu the daughter of the family experience a love affair with Velutha
the families carpenter, a man from the “untouchable” or Paravan caste.
Ammu’s love affair with a member of an untouchable caste is considered
a forbidden love according to the caste system in India, which divides
people into classes and makes the lower class people “untouchable”.
Risking to interact with one of these untouchables, Ammu violates the
caste system, which also causes the family to fall apart and also, Ammu’s
twins, Estha and Rahel to be separated from each other. Sophie Mol’s
unfortunate drowning, though, occurs in , Roy’s story begins twenty
three years later, when Rahel comes back to home in India, to Estha where
there is desire that the love of the twins for each other will heal their deep
suffering. Rahel comes back to Ayemenem as an adult to “a decimated
household, a dysfunctional twin and a decaying house” (45).
Much of Roy’s third-person narrative is told mainly from the point of
view of the two fraternal twin protagonists, Rahel and Estha. She constructs
her narration moving backwards from present-day India to the fateful
drowning that occurred twenty three years earlier, in With flashbacks
from the present to the past; Roy fabricates her plot with an increasing
suspense till the end of the novel. She structures her narration so skillfully
that the malignant tragedy is not fully illustrated until the final scenes of
the novel. Roy tells and reveals gradually the story of all characters and the
shocking series of events throughout her text.
As at the outset of the paper has been pointed out, Roy’s The God of
Small Things is the story of the visit and the drowning of Sophie Mol
resulting in the destruction of the innocent lives and their splitting up from
each other when she comes to see her Indian father, Chacko, during her
Charismas holiday. Upon coming to India, Sophie Mol is not aware of the
disaster waiting for her. One they she is out with her Indian cousins, Estha
and Rahel, on the mysterious river in Ayemenem, she suddenly drowns
which makes the family, especially, Margaret grieved. The catastrophic
event occur even if English Margaret, who is “traveling to the Heart of
Darkness, has been acknowledged by her friends to “take everything” and
to “be prepared” on the grounds of the fact that “anything can happen to
anyone” in India ().
As Sophie’s mothers friend’s have estimated, the most horrifying incident
she might experience in her life happens, and “green weed and river grime
were woven into her beautiful redbrown hair” of her daughter, and her
child’s eyelids were “nibbled at by fish” (). Margaret never forgives
herself for not listening to her friends, and taking Sophie to India but she
understands her mistake very lately after her losing her daughter in India.
Sophie Mole’s drowning is a metaphoric sign of the hegemony of the Eastern
over the European, which has the power to swallow up the colonizers easily.
This is also the power of the wilderness and primitiveness of Eastern that
the colonial elements always fear and never resist. Postcolonial discourse
maintains that the threat of the Eastern for the European is either to devour
the European in the wilderness or to make the Europeans go wild. The
death of Sophie Mol in Roy’s story metaphorically illustrates that there is
no escape from the tragic fate waiting for the colonizer in the colonial land.
As previously mentioned, the deep interaction with the colonizer creates
not only the suffering of the colonizer but also that of the colonized that
recognized and felt upset and anxious about the inferiority of their own
culture when compare to that of the colonizer. The feeling of the inferiority
created a community that was not glad about his existence, and that had
no peace anymore. The colonized having felt their inferiority, appreciated
everything that belonged to the colonizer and forget their own history,
culture, and language.
To be precise, they transformed into a nation who had not culture of
their own, and felt second-class thereby struggling to become a member of
the superior culture of the colonized. Thus, as it is stated in novel several
times “things can changes in a day” (32), implies the day on which the
colonizer’s arrival has changed everything in the land of the colonized.
In The God of Small Things, Chacko Kochamma, the uncle of the twins,
describes the colonized people as “prisoners of war”, as a result of which
their “dreams have been doctored” and they “belong nowhere”. According
to him, it is a kind of war that has occupied their minds that they “have
won and lost. The very worst sort of war. A war that captures dreams
and re-dreams them. A war that has made them adore their captures and
despise themselves” (53) Frantz Fanon in his A Dying Colonialism (),
argues that “the challenging of the very principle of foreign domination
brings about essential mutations in the consciousness of the colonized,
in the manner in which he perceives the colonizer, in his human states in
the world” (Gandhi, ). Seeing themselves inferior, the colonized
people recognized that the only way to make their situation better is to
become similar to the colonizer, and thus, they try to imitate the colonizers
ideas, values and practices. They appreciate and value the colonizers way
of living and try to imitate their culture in view of not having of their own.
Roy in narrating Chacko’s thoughts reports:
Chacko told the twins though he hated to admit it, they were
all anglophile. They were a family of Anglophiles. Pointed in the
wrong direction, trapped outside their own history, and unable to
retrace their steps because their footprints had been swept away. He
explained to them that history was like an old house at night. With
all the lamps lit. And ancestors whispering inside. ‘To understand
history, ‘Chacko said, we have to go inside and listen to what they’re
saying. And look at the books and the pictures on the wall. And
smells the smells.’ (52)
Roy in her novel narrates clearly how the colonized people appreciate
the English culture and their considerable effort to become like them by
way of imitation. There are seen perfectly in different behaviors of the
natives in the novel toward the half English Chacko’s daughter Sophie
Mole and her Indian twin cousins, Rahel and Estha. When Chacko’s half
English daughter Sophie and her mother Margaret come to India, every
body in the family is impatiently awaited for their arrival. Sophie Mole’s
half English identity is important both for the members of the family
and for the people outside. The importance of an English cousin can be
obviously presented in the speech of a man from outside the family where
Roy illustrates the scene as the following:
The twins squatted on their haunches, like professional adults gossip in
the Ayemenem market.
They sat in silence for a while. Kuttappen mortified, the twins
preoccupied with boat thought.
‘Has Chacko Saar’s Mol come?’ Kuttappen asked.
when they compare themselves to their half English cousin, Sophie Mol,
since they are just the imitation of English, not real ones. Roy depicts
the difference between the twins and Sophie Mol throughout the novel.
She describes Sophie Mol as one of the “little angles” who “were beach-
colored and wore bell bottoms”, while Rahel and Estha are depicted as
two evil where we are told: “Littledemons were mudbrown in Airport fairy
frocks with forehead bumps that might turn into horns with fountains in
love-in-Tokyos. And backword-reading habits. And if you cared to look,
you cold see Satan in their eyes. ().
Baby Kochamma twin’s aunt also gives an expression on the difference
between Sophie Mol and the twins. She describes Sophie Mol as “so
beautiful that she reminded her of a wood- sprite. Of Ariel.” Ariel in
Shakespeare’s The Tempest (). While in describing the twins she say, “
‘They’re sly. They’re uncouth. Deceitful. They are growing wild you can’t
manage them” (). This point maintains that such a great appreciation
that they love even their children as long as they imitate the values of the
other culture, and dissemble to be a member of that culture. Roy’s another
character who suffers from being a hybrid aspect is Pappachi Kochamma,
the grandfather of the twins whom with his strong passion to be an English
man in manner and appearance.
Pappachi Ammu’s father is a man who after retiring from Government
service in Delhi having worked for many years as an Imperial Entomologist
at the Pusa Institute, and who come to live in Ayemenem with his wife,
Mammachi, his son Chacko and his daughter Ammu till he dies. Pappachi
tries always to imitate the English way of clothing and as Roy illustrates
“until the day he died, even in the stifling Ayemenem heat, even single day,
Pappachi wore a well prepared three-piece suit and his gold pocket watch”
(49).
It is his strong passion to another culture that makes him dress a suit,
not his traditional clothing, mumudu and “khaki Judhpurs though he had
never ridden a horse in his life” (51). Ammu his daughter in describing
such a great appreciation of the other culture where we are told “Ammu
said that Pappachi was an incurable British CCP, which was short for chhi
chhi poach and in Hindu meant shit-wiper” (51). Chacko also as Ammu is
aware of how his father is keen on the English culture where Roy reports:
Chacko said that the correct word for people like Pappachi was
Anglophile. He made Rahel and Estha look up Anglophile in the
not belonging to either the culture of the colonized or that of the colonizer.
Roy in reporting Chacko’s suffering of hybridization states that: “our minds
have been invaded by a war. A war that we have won and lost. The very
worst sort of war. A war that captures dreams and re-dreams them. A war
that has made us adore our conquerors and despite ourselves” (53). This
point highlights that the colonized always look down upon and scorns their
own culture, thereby they are uprooted from their culture and appreciates
whatever the colonizer has; therefore, they try to imitate them without
being to be a member of it on account of not being European in blood.
Chacko educated at Oxford University, realizes that their country and
mind have been captured by the colonizer and he depicts his own people
as “anglophile” “a person well disposed to the English” (52). However,
he himself is aware of being an anglophile, when he comes to loving
something that belongs to the English culture. His anglophile identity
is approved when he gets married to an English woman. As Ammu, his
sister, regards it on as marrying “our conquerors”. Chacko like his father’s
admiration of the English way of clothing appreciates the manners and
attitudes an English woman has. Roy in portraying Chacko’s admiration
of his English wife states:
As for Chacko, Margaret Kochamma was the first female friend
he had ever had. Not just the first woman that he had slept with, but
his first real companion. What Chacko loved most about her was her
self-sufficiency. Perhaps it wasn’t remarkable in the average English
women, but it was remarkable to Chacko.
He loved the fact that Margaret Kochamma didn’t cling to him
that she was uncertain about her feeling for him. That he never know
till the last day whether or not she would marry him. He loved the
way she would sit up naked in his bed, her long white back swiveled
away from him, look at her watch and say in her practical way –
‘Oops, I must be off.’ He loved the way she wobbled to work every
morning on her bicycle. He encouraged their differences in opinion,
and inwardly rejoiced at her occasional outburst of exasperation at
his decadence. ().
Roy in giving the reason why Chacko admires Margaret, which is a
kind of looking up down on Indian women, reports that, “He was grateful
to his wife for not wanting to look after him. For not offering to tidy his
room. For not being cloying mother. He grew too depend on Margaret
Kochamma for not depending on him. He adored her for not adoring him”
(). Although Chacko appreciates his English wife for not wanting to
look after him, unlike his Indian mother, the same English woman leaves
him just because he is not used to looking after himself, which is quite
clear in the following description:
That it was impossible for him to consider making the bed, or
washing clothes or dishes. That he didn’t apologize for the cigarette
burns in the new sofa. That he seemed incapable of buttoning up
his shirt, knotting his tie and tying his shoe laces before presenting
himself for a job interview ().
The important point that arises here is that his marriage to a married
woman becomes successful to the extent that he is able to hide his real
Indian Identity and plays his role successfully as the husband of an English
woman. The reason their marriage ends in divorce results in the interaction
between his own culture as the colonized and the culture of his wife as the
colonizer and his belonging to neither of them.
Although Chacko and Pappachi do their best to look like the colonizer
both in manner and attitudes, they become the victims of the interaction
with the colonizers’ culture that is regarded as superior. Despite their
endeavor to imitate the colonizer, considering their behavior throughout
the novel it is impossible for them to escape from their own identity, being
Indian in blood, not English. Roy, as a postcolonial writer, in her novel tries
to focus on the sufferings of the colonized originated from the interaction
with the colonized.
Besides Roy’s hybrid characters which can be understood as an evidence
of the contamination arrived with the colonizer, in order to prove how
dreadful suffering the arrival of the colonizer has brought to the colonial
land, the day on which Sophie Mol come to India is used as metaphorically,
and it stands for the coming of the colonizers. Sophie Mol with her English
mother Margaret comes from England to India to see her Indian father,
Chacko. Her coming to India is important because it stands for that of
the colonizer and in what ways it has brought about the sufferings of the
people in the colonial territory. Roy explains throughout the novel the great
influence of Sophie Mol in disturbing the tranquil situation in India and the
destructive effects of her visit. The most shattering effects can be seen in
the Estha and Rahel character, both of whom “hadn’t seen each other since
Estha’s return in a train with his pointy shoes rolled into his khaki hold
all”(32). Rahel immediately after separation of Estha from Ayemenem
loses her mother Ammu, too. Rahel also loves her Ayemenem and her twin
brother and wander from school to school. On the whole, Sophie Mol’s
arrival to India changed their faith and caused all these disastrous events.
The life in Ayemenem before her arrival was peaceful and tranquil. Roy in
illustrating the Ayemenem maintains that “Here, however, it was peace time
and the family in the Plymouth traveled without fear or foreboding”(35).
Sophie Mol’s arrival representing the colonizer disturbs the peaceful life in
Ayemenem. This is obviously observable when Roy portrays the situation
as, “You couldn’t see the river from the window anymore… and their has
come a time when uncles became fathers, mother’s lovers and cousins died
and had funerals. It was a time when the unthinkable became thinkable and
the impossible really happened” (31).
REFERENCES
Ashcroft, B. (). “England through Colonial Eyes in Twentieth-
Century Fiction”, CLIO, 34(),
Ashcroft, Bill, et al. (). The Empire Writes Back: Theory and
Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures. London: Routledge.
Ashcroft, Bill, et al. The Postcolonial Studies Reader. London:
Routledge,
Bhabha, Homi K. (). The Location of Culture. London and New
York: Routledge,
Gandhi, L. (). Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction. St.
Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin.
Moore-Gilbert, B. (). Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices,
Politics. London: Verso.
Moore-Gilbert, B. et al (Eds.). (). Postcolonial Criticism. London:
Longman.
Needham, A. D. (), “The Small Voice of History in Arundhati
Roy’s”, The God of Small Things IJPS, Volume 7, N 3,
Roy, Arundhati (). The God of Small Things. London,
Falmingo.
Tickell, A. (). “The God of Small Things: Arundhati Roy’s
Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism. The Journal of Commonwealth
Literature,
ABSTRACT
The study is in fact a collection of the proverbs used by proverbs of
the Iraqi Turkmen’s which contain the names of some of the insects . the
animals mentioned in the proverbs grouped together here seem to be the
animals that existed in the environment of the Turkmen’s, whether it be
their home, his farm or where he traveled .
Since those animals have certain characteristics such as patience,
friendship, love or treason, the Turkmens seem to have tried & express
those characteristics of animals by proverbs used by humans aiming at
applying them & humans in an in direct and mostly metaphorical way.
it is necessary & observe that some of the animals are mentioned more
than others due to the fact that those animals like the “ dog ”, “ sheep ” ,
“ donkey”, “ camel ”, “ horse ” etc.
Man in his travels and movements and / or they live In his environment
and they he depends on them for his living like the whale monkey,
giraffe
Some of the animals are either rarely mentioned at all turtle etc.
the reason is that either there animals do not have characteristics similar
& there which the humans have or because they do not exist in turkman
environment.
It is also important to pay attention & the literary value of these
proverbs since they are expressed in figurative way and sometimes
these sayings are rhymed and contain assonance or resonance, and other
figures of speech in addition & their social value as saying that contain
wise words.
Key Words : Proverbs, Turkmen, Iraqi.
The Proverbs of the Iraqi Turkmans , as is the case with the other
nations of the world , express the implications of social , economic and
psychological life of the people. These proverbs express in the best way
most of the events that have taken place and continue to take place in
detail in the everyday life of the people. Mostly, these proverbs are cited
or uttered in brief and simple expressions in such a way that makes them
easy to memorize and use generation after generation. If we look at the
proverbs of Iraqi Turkmans we find that they have expressed people’s
feelings of happiness and sadness besides their life experiences. One
can see that these proverbs are expressions of human characteristics like
love, hatred, bravery, generosity, cooperation and so on in addition to
expressing the relations of the human beings with one another wherever
they be. The present paper deals with the use of various animal (and some
insect) names that existed in the environment of the Turkmans since the
early days of history, whether that be in his home, or farm or wherever
he travelled. And since humans have always been in contact with these
animals and since each kind of those animals have characteristics which
may have their counterparts in humans like patience, treason, love or
betrayal, human beings have tried to express those characteristic of
animals by proverbs that are used by humans to apply those characteristics
on humans although that has been mostly in an indirect or metaphorical
way. It is important to notice that the proverbs most frequent used in our
everyday life and which are most effective and expressive among the
Turkmen proverbs are those in which one species of animals is used.
Just for example we mention some of those proverbs which are well-known
among the Turkmans:
– Attan iner eşeğe miner (biner). Which means:
He gets down a horse and gets on a donkey.
– Aslan ağzından av alınmaz .
No prey can be taken out of the mouth of the lion.
– İki kuşu bir taştan (taşla) vurdu.
He hit two birds by one stone.
– Balık suda mamele (alış veriş) edilmez .
Bargaining over the fish cannot be done while the fish is
inside the water
– Deve öz (kendi) kanburunu görmez.
Anyhow, we can notice that in any of the Turkmen proverbs the names of
most of the animals that exist in the areas (locations) in which the Turkmans
live have been used. However certain animals have been used more than
others like the dog, the wolf, the donkey, the camel, the horse, the sheep
and others. It seems that the reason behind the frequent use of these animals
more than the other ones in the proverbs is that those animals have since
the old time accompanied the humans in their travels, and have lived with
them in their environment besides being a source of living and comfort
and a means of transportation and carrier of luggage in their movement
from place to place. Some other animals have been a source of danger and
annoyance for humans and their pets and domestic animals. It is worth
mentioning that some of the animals are rarely used or mentioned in the
Iraqi Turkmen proverbs like the pig, the deer, the peacock, and the tiger;
whereas there are some other animals which have not been mentioned in
Turkmen proverbs like the monkey, the giraffe and the turtle. The reason
behind the rarity of using or not mentioning some species of animals (or
insects) in Turkmen proverbs is because they do not have characteristics
and features similar to those of the humans or because those animals do
not exist in the areas where Turkoman live. Any scrutinizing view at the
Turkmen proverbs that are fixed in the existing references mentioned at the
end of the study show that about () two thousand proverbs are fixed in
the references the proverbs that include the names of animals are (). It
means that more than a quarter of the total number of the Turkmen proverbs
include the names of animals. It is seen that (64) different species of animals
and insects are used in these proverbs. Definitely, the more proverbs are
discovered by the researcher, the larger number of the species will be.
The following is an index of the species of animals used in Turkmen
proverbs arranged according to the frequency of each species we start with
the species that are used and repeated more than others and then we move
to the types/species that are used less than others with an example for each
type. It should be noticed that some species of animals’ name equals the
number of some other species. There are many proverbs in which two or
even three species of animals are mentioned in one proverb. These will be
mentioned later:
The fox cannot enter its whole and then it fixes a sweeper in its tail.
The pig (donguz/domuz): it is mentioned in (7) proverbs.
e.g Dongozdan (domuzdan) bir tük (tüy) kopsun gene kardı(r).
Evin if a hair is taken from the pig it is a gain.
The greyhound (tazı): it is mentioned in (7) proverbs.
e.g Tazısız ava çıkan tavşansız eve döner.
He who goes hunting without a greyhound, comes back home without
a rabbit.
The bull (sığır/öküz): it is mentioned in (6) proverbs.
e.g Sığır kasaphaneye ulaştıktan sonra bıçak hazırdı(r).
By the arrival of the bull in the slaughter house the knife is ready (to
slay).
The mouse (sıçan/fare): it is mentioned in (6) proverbs.
e.g Sıçan çıktığı deliği tanır.
The mouse well knows the hole from which it has come out.
The owl (baykuş): it is mentioned in (6) proverbs.
e.g Allah baykuşun rızkını ayağına gönderi(r).
God sends the owl its food.
The bee (arı): it is mentioned in (5) proverbs.
e.g Arı bal alacağ (alacak) çiçeği tanır.
The bee knows the flower from which it takes the honey.
The goose (kaz): it is mentioned in (5) proverbs.
e.g Tavuk kaz yumurtası doğmaz.
The hen cannot lay eggs of goose.
The dog (it): it is mentioned in (5) proverbs.
e.g Kervan yürür it hürür.
The convoy continues to move while the dog howls.
The mule (katır): it is mentioned in (4) proverbs.
e.g Deve ırağına, katır tırnağına bakar.
The camel looks far , whereas the mule looks at its nails.
The lamb (kuzu): it is mentioned in (4) proverbs.
e.g Koyun öz kuzusunu basmaz.
The sheep does not walk over its own lamb.
The sparrow (serçe): it is mentioned in (4) proverbs.
e.g Yüz serçe bir kazan doldurmaz.
A hundred sparrows do not fill a cauldron.
The rabbit (tavşan): it is mentioned in (4) proverbs.
e.g Her yerin tavşanını o yerin tazısı tutar.
The rabbits of each land are caught by its hunting dogs.
The animal (hayvan): it is mentioned in (4) proverbs.
e.g Hayvan hayvanı okşar, insan insanı.
e.g. Göz açmamış kör yarasa balasına (yavrusuna) benziri (benziyor)
He looks like the close eyed baby of a bat .
The water buffalo ( gamış , manda): it is mentioned in(1) proverb.
e.g. Ne gamış (manda) sağmışam ne deve kırkmışam.
I have neither milked a water buffalo nor cut the hair of a camel .
The chick (ferig/küçük tavuk ): it is mentioned in(1)proverb.
e.g. Bizim horozdan (horozla ) siziv (sizing) feriği (küçük tavuk)
aşınadı(r). Our cock and your hen are in love.
The monster (canavar): it is mentioned in (1) proverb.
e.g. Üz (yüz) verilen canavar deği (l).
He is not the type of monster that can be welcome .
64 . The fiend, demon (dev): it is mentioned in (1) proverb.
e.g. Ev derdi, dev derdi.
The concerns of home equal the concerns of the fiend.
Below is a list of proverbs in which two or more types of animals are
mentioned.
REFERENCES
Al-Dakuki, İbrahim. Turkmen Public Arts (in Arabic), Baghdad, Dar
Al-Zaman Publishing House,
Benderoğlu, Abdullatıf. Turkmans in the Iraq of Revolution (in Arabic),
Baghdad: Dar Al-Hurriya,
Bendioğlu, Abdullatif Our Proverbs, 2 vols (in Turkish). Baghdad
House of General cultural Affairs,
Terzibashi, Ata. Kirkuk Proverbs Baghdad: Al-Zaman Publishing
House, .
Dakuklu, Mohammed Khourshid. The Garden of Old Sayings (in
Turkish) Baghdad: House of General Cultural Affairs,
Zabit, Shakir Sabir, The Proverbs of Iraqi Turkmans (in Turkish),
Baghdad: Dar al-Basri,
ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ТУНИССКОГО
АРАБО-ЯЗЫЧНОГО РОМАНА
NADİROVA, G. E./НАДИРОВА, Г. Е.
KAZAKİSTAN/KAZAKHSTAN/КАЗАХСТАН
ÖZET
Roman, edebî tür olarak Arap dilli Tunus edebiyatında bağımsızlık anın-
dan günümüze kadar önemli yere sahiptir, asırlarca süren teşekkül etme ve
gelişme süreci kanıtlar ki, Tunus romanı, dış etkilere açık, toplumsal ve
sanatsal şuurun oluşmasına etki gösteren canlı sanatsal varlıktır.
Roman sanatının genel akınında roman-sosyal araştırma ve entelektüel
roman, onun yaratıcı, manalı miras unsurlarını aktif şekilde çekmek, şim-
diki düşünce teşebbüsleriyle önemli role sahiptir.
Roman metinleri dil seviyesinde edebî dil mevcuttur, şive, klasik miras
dili, Fransızca, yazarlar onları yaratıcı ve manalı tek bir metine birleştir-
meye çalışmışlardır.
Tür seviyesinde sürekli arama ve yenileme süreci sonucunda, entere-
san ve beklenmedik neticelere ulaşılır, örneğin, roman-piyes türü, dram
eserinin anlatı eseriyle tamamlanmasıdır, neticede değişik edebî tarz, yeni
edebî bir tür ortaya çıkmıştır.
Romanda şahıs ve onun çevresi, şahıs ve onun varoluşu arasındaki
uyumsuzluğun genel duyusu belirtilmiştir, bu yaratıcılık yenilenme, kav-
ramsal ve kültürel aramanın sürekli teşebbüsünde ifade edilir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Roman, sanat, miras, gelişim, modernizm.
ABSTRACT
The novel as a genre has occupied a prominent position in the Arabic-
language Tunisian literature since its independence. The century-long pro-
cess shows that the Tunisian novel is a live artistic organism open to external
influences and itself influencing the society and art. “Social research nov-
els” and “intellectual novels”, which try to assess the present while actively
using elements of artistic legacy, play an important role within the genre.
Standard Arabic, dialect, classic legacy language and French co-exist at the
language level. At the form level a constant process of search and change
goes on which leads to unexpected and interesting results such as novel-
play where narrative is added drama resulting in a new original genre, new
literary form. The novel expresses the general feling og discord between the
man and his existence, the man and the environment, which is reflected in the
constant search for creative renewal.
Key Words: Novel, art, haritage, evolution, modernism.
Ключевые слова: Pоман, творчество, наследие, эволюция, модер-
низм.
Тунисская литература, новая и современная, представляет собой
важную часть арабской литературы в целом, значение которой пос-
тоянно возрастает. Долгое время она оставалась под большим влия-
нием литературы арабского Машрика (Египта, Сирии, Ливана и дру-
гих стран региона к востоку от Египта), даже копировала ее. Одна-
ко постепенно, особенно в последние десятилетия ей удалось выйти
из-под этого влияния, у нее появились свои объективные причины и
художественные средства, которые дали ей возможность утвердиться
и преодолеть этап ученичества и социально-политической ангажиро-
ванности, обозначить свое видение действительности.
Арабо-язычная тунисская литература, как и вся магрибинская (Ал-
жира, Туниса, Марокко, Ливии) литература в целом, в эпоху коло-
ниализма испытывала значительные трудности, препятствовавшие ее
развитию, распространению и обогащению теми художественными
особенностями, которые сегодня отличают ее от франкоязычной ли-
тературы стран Магриба. Долгое время именно франкоязычная лите-
ратура региона пользовалась особым вниманием читателей, критиков,
как арабских, так и зарубежных (Ghazi,;8). Имелись многочис-
ленные исследования по ее стилистике, структуре, конструкции, идей-
ным позициям и критическим суждениям, особенно по жанру романа.
Благодаря постоянному вниманию и поощрению появилось целое по-
коление прекрасных писателей-романистов, пишущих на французс-
ком языке, которые преодолели узкую локальность, чтобы осознать
принадлежность всему миру. Это Катиб Йасин, Мулуд Фер‘аун и Му-
луд Маммери в Алжире, Альбер Мемми в Тунисе, Тахар Бенджеллун
и Дрис Шрайби в Марокко и другие. Франкоязычный магрибинский
роман активно развивался как в количественном, так и в качественном
ABSTRACT
The present report deals with genesis of the genre of Arabic literature
known as biography of the Prophet and development of the most prominent
biography - Sirat Rasul Allah (Biography of the Messenger of Allah)
compiled by Ibn Ishaq and edited by Ibn Hisham. The author traces back
how the collection and transmission of the hadith (Tradition on the deeds
and sayings of the Prophet) has developed first into compilations devoted
to separate subjects, for instance, maghazi (military expeditions), and later
into full biographies of the Prophet which covered all the events of his
life from birth to death. The second part of the article is dedicated to the
authors of the biography in question: the famous authority on maghazi
Muhammad ibn Ishaq who compiled the original biography which hasn’t
been preserved intact till nowadays and philologist ‘Abd al-Malik ibn
Hisham who edited and supplemented the work of the predecessor.
Key Words: Middle Age, Arabic literature, Sirat Rasul Allah (Biography
of the Messenger of Allah).
Резюме
Ас-Сира ан-набавиййа (араб. «Жизнеописание Пророка») – жанр
арабской литературы, который в Средние века занимал довольно вы-
сокое место в номенклатуре жанров арабской литературы. По мнению
многих ученых, жизнеописание Пророка является третьим по значи-
мости источником для изучения ислама после Корана и сунны.
Произведения жанра сира традиционно рассматривали как источ-
ники по истории ислама и биографии Мухаммада, а как памятники
литературы они довольно мало изучены.
), когда тот находился в Хире, и сочинил для него «Магази», а за-
тем окончательно поселился в Багдаде (Ибн Халликан, б.г.; 4, ).
Ранние мусульманские критики относились к Ибн Исхаку по-раз-
ному: некоторые ученые считали его одним из главных знатоков пре-
дания, (напр., Абу Зур‘а, ал-Мадини, Ибн Ма‘ин и Ибн Са‘д), другие
не считали достоверными хадисы, которые он передавал (напр., ан-
Ниса‘и, ал-Асрам, Сулайман ат-Тайми и Вухайб ибн Халид). Законовед
и знаток предания, основатель ханбалитского мазхаба мусульманс-
кого права «имам Багдада» Ахмад ибн Ханбал (// гг.)
признавал авторитет Ибн Исхака в области магази, но не принимал
хадисы в его передаче, поскольку возражал против использования
коллективного иснада (такой вид иснада, когда в начале перечисляют-
ся все передатчики, а потом приводится текст хадиса, но слова одного
передатчика никак не отделяются от слов других), к которому часто
прибегал Ибн Исхак. Однако по свидетельству Ибн Халликана, Ахмад
ибн Ханбал считал хадисы в передаче Ибн Исхака верными, но не при-
знавал его авторитетом в юридических вопросах, хотя последний и
называл себя знатоком фикха (мусульманского права). Ибрахим ибн
Са‘д передавал со ссылкой на Ибн Исхака около 17 тысяч хадисов,
посвященных юридическим вопросам, не считая сообщений о магази.
В своде аз-Захаби есть следующее сообщение об этом: «сказал мне
Ибрахим ибн Хамза: Ибрахим ибн Са‘ад передавал от Ибн Исхака 17
тысяч хадисов, содержащих заповеди, помимо тех, что посвящены ма-
гази. Я сказал: это из-за повтора способов передачи хадисов. А что
касается заповедей, то их количество не превышает и десятой части
этого» (аз-Захаби, ; 7, 39). Что касается коллективного иснада,
то, как считают некоторые современные исследователи, например,
Дж.М.Б. Джоунс, это обвинение не совсем справедливо, так как такой
вид иснада активно использовался всеми ранними авторами произве-
дений магази и сира (Джоунс, ).
Помимо посвященной Пророку «Китаб ал-магази ва ас-сийар»
(«Книги завоевательных походов и жизнеописаний») Ибн Исхак со-
ставил «Китаб ал-хулафа’» («Книга халифов») и книгу «Сунан»
(«Предания»). «Книга завоевательных походов и жизнеописаний»
Ибн Исхака состояла из трех частей: «ал-Мубтада’» («Начало»), «ал-
Маб‘ас» («Пророческая миссия») и «ал-Магази» («Завоевательные
походы»). Значительная часть «Китаб ал-магази» сохранилась в ре-
дакции Йунуса ибн Букайра ибн Васила аш-Шайбани (Сезгин, ;
Мьюр - Muir W., (), Life of Mahomet (reprint of the edition
London ). Osnnabrück.
Пиотровский М.Б., (), Введение и примечания. – Раздел
1. Мухаммад и начало Ислама / Хрестоматия по Исламу. Москва:
Наука.
Сезгин - Sezgin F., (), Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums.
Leiden.
«Сира» - Das Leben Muhammeds nach Muhammed Ibn Ishak bear-
beitet von Abd el-Malik Ibn Hischam. Herausgegeben von F. Wüstenfeld,
(), Göttingen: Dietrich.
Уотт, - Watt W.M., (), “The materials used by Ibn Ishaq”,
B. Lewis and P.M. Holt (ed.) Historians of the Middle East. London.
Уотт, - Watt W.M., (), “Ibn Hisham”, Encyclopaedia of
Islam. Cd-rom ed. Brill academic publishers.
Хайндс - Hinds M., (), “al-Maghazi”, Encyclopaedia of Islam.
Cd-rom ed. Brill academic publishers.
Шидфар Б.Я., (), «Генезис и вопросы арабского народ-
ного романа (сиры)», Генезис романа в литературах Азии и Африки.
Москва.
NEBİYEV, Bekir
AZERBAYCAN/AZERBAIJAN/АЗЕРБАЙДЖАН
ÖZET
Azərbaycanlı mühacirlərin çox zəngin, ədəbi, elmi, publisist irsi var. Bu
xəzinədə Əlibəy Hüseynzadə, Əhməd Ağaoğlu, Mehmet Əmin Rəsulzadə,
Səməd Ağa oğlu, Mirzə Bala Mehmetzadə, Əlimərdan bəy Topçubaşov,
Ceyhun Hacıbəyli, Əhməd Cəfəroğlu, Əbdülvahab Yurdsevər, Almas
İldırım, Banin (Ümmülbanu), Mehmet Sadiq Aran və digər önəmli simaların
əsərləri bulunur. Onların hələ indi-indi, imkan düşdükcə İstanbuldan və
Ankaradan, Tehrandan və Təbrizdən, Parisdən və Berlindən tapılıb bizə
ulaşan kitabları, jurnal və qəzet kəsikləri, məktubları, nadir əlyazmalarından
parçalar, şəxsi arşivlərindən bəzi yarpaqlar mühacirətdəki alimlərimizin
yaradıcılığının mövzu və problem vüsətindən xəbər verməkdədir.
Mühacir alimlərin Azərbaycan dili, ədəbiyyatı, kültürü, folklor və etnoq
rafiyası ilə bağlı çoxsaylı araşdırmaları milli ədəbiyyatşünaslıq elminin
gəlişməsində özəl bir mərhələ təşkil edir və hazırda Azərbaycan mühacirət
ədəbiyyatşünaslığı adı altında öyrənilir.
Konqrenin Ədəbiyyat elmlərinin problemləri bölməsində söylənməsi
nəzərdə tutulan tebliğimizdə Ə.Hüseynzadə və Ə. Ağaoğlunun dəyərli
elmi irsi, özəlliklə Ə. Cəfəroğlunun Azərbaycan folkloruna həsr edilmiş
sanballı məqalələri, eləcə də C. Hacıbəylinin «Qarabağ dialekti və
folkloru» monoqrafiyası, M. Ə. Rəsulzadənin «Azərbaycan şairi Nizami»
kitabı geniş təhlil olunur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Azərbaycan, əlm, ədəbiyyat, mühacirat, tankid.
ABSTRACT
Azerbaijani Literature in Emigration
Azerbaijani emigrants left behind rich cultural, scientific and literary
heritage. There are works of Ali-bey Husein-zadeh, Ahmed Agha-oghlu,
nümunələr əsasında belə düzgün bir nəticəyə gəlmişdi ki, hər cür senzor
maneələrinə və partiya orqanlarının çox sərt nəzarətinə baxmayaraq
«qırmızı istilanın kommunizm ölkəsində milli hissi öldürdüyünə dair
söylənən bədbin hökmlər mübaliğəlidir. Bu hiss yaşayır, çarpışır və millətin
ruhunu əks etdirən aynada – onun ədəbiyyatında öz əksini tapır».
M. Ə. Rəsulzadənin ədəbiyyatşünaslıq sahəsində ən sanballı əsəri
«Azərbaycan şairi Nizami» monoqrafiyasıdır. Bu kitab şairin əsərlərini
və onun ətrafında aparılmış tədqiqatları orijinalında, yəni farsca oxuyan,
yüksək elmi səviyyəyə və incə bədii zövqə malik olan bir alimin çoxillik
araşdırmalarının məhsuludur. Dörd fəsildən ibarət kitab Nizami Gəncəvinin
dövrü, mühiti, həyatı, yaradıcılığı, ədəbi sələflərinə münasibəti, sənətdə
xələflərinin şairə münasibəti, «Xəmsə»nin bədii xüsusiyyətləri, Nizami
ədəbi məktəbi və s. haqqında sanballı monoqrafiyadır.
Müqəddimədə müəllif Nizaminin irsi və onun yaradıcılıq taleyi ilə bu və
ya digər dərəcədə bağlı olan bir sıra çox vacib problemləri işıqlandırmışdır.
Bunlardan biri Şərq mədəniyyətinə türklərin, Azərbaycan xalqının verdiyi
qiymətli töhfə məsələsidir. O, belə bir fikri əsaslandırır ki, Şərq aləmində
bəzi hallarda islam mədəniyyəti adı altında birləşdirilən elm, ədəbiyyat,
incəsənət, xüsusən poeziya əsərlərinin yaranmasında ərəblərlə bərabər,
onlar qədər, bəzi sahələrdə hətta onlardan da artıq türklərin və farsların
xidmətləri vardır. Bu sahədə adları bir qayda olaraq həmişə birinci çəkilən
görkəmli sənət korifeyləri arasında fars Ə.Firdovsi, özbək Ə.Nəvai ilə
yanaşı azərbaycanlı N. Gəncəvinin də şərəfli adı xüsusi əzəmətlə səslənir.
Şairin əsərlərindən aldığı çoxsaylı faktlar və onların elmi təhlili əsasında
müəllif dönə-dönə təkrar edir ki, Nizami qəlbi türk sevgisi, Qafqaz şəraiti
ilə bağlı olan, yurdunun tarixi müqəddəratından və ölkəsinin özünəməxsus
gözəlliklərindən nəşət edən bir Azərbaycan şairidir.
Nizaminin şəxsiyyəti məsələsi bütün əsər boyu müəllifin diqqət
mərkəzindədir. Lakin kitabın birinci fəslində Nizaminin tərcümeyi-halına
dair müxtəlif mənbələrdən toplanmış faktları, eləcə də şairin Azərbaycan
hökmdarları ilə münasibətlərinə dair onun özünün «Xəmsə»də yazdıqları
əsasında tədqiqatçı bu böyük söz ustadının şəxsiyyətini bugünün oxucusu
üçün daha da doğmalaşdırır, vüqarı, əyilməzliyi, mənəvi ucalığı barədə
təsəvvürləri zənginləşdirir. Bu zəmində Nizaminin dünya ədəbiyaytında
mövqeyi məsələsinin qoyuluşu bizə daha inandırıcı görünür. Azərbaycan,
İran və Hindistanın görkəmli söz ustalarından gətirilən etiraflar bir daha
təsdiq edir ki, «aşiqanə məsnəvilər yazmaqda… heç kim şeyx həzrətlərinin
(Nizaminin) səviyyəsinə yüksələ bilməmişdir. Nizaminin izilə getmək
və onun xırmanından qalan başaqları toplamaq məqsədilə Əmir Xosrov
KAYNAKÇA
1. Cabbarlı, N., (), Mühacirət və klassik ədəbi irs. Bakı: Elm,
2. Cəfəroğlu, Ə., (), «Modern Azərbaycan ədəbiyyatına toplu bir
baxış», Azərbaycan yurd bilgisi. İstanbul, sayı 37,
3. Yurdsevər, Ə., (), Azərbaycan dram ədəbiyyatı. Ankara,
ÖZET
Orhan Veli, Türk şiir tarihinde önemli bir kırılma ve değişme evresi olan
Garip şiirinin öncüsü ve en tanınmış şairidir. Şiire Ahmet Haşim, Yahya
Kemal Beyatlı, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Ahmet Muhip Dranas ve Necip
Fazıl Kısakürek gibi şairlerin etkisinde kaldığı örneklerle başlamış, ancak
daha sonra geleneğin temsilcisi saydığı isimlerini zikrettiğimiz şairlerden
farklı bir sanat anlayışı doğrultusunda yepyeni, “garip” addedilecek eserler
kaleme almıştır. Söz konusu eserlerini yazarken de kanaatimizce bütün ge-
lenekle hesaplaşmakla birlikte en çok Ahmet Haşim’in şiir anlayışını göz
önünde bulundurmuştur. Bir bakıma onun şiirine Ahmet Haşim’in şiiriyle
hesaplaşmanın ürünü olarak da bakılabilir. Bu bağlamda “The Influence of
Anxiety” adlı kitabında Harold Bloom’un da kullandığı terimlerden yola
çıkarak söyleyecek olursak, öncü şair-selefi Ahmet Haşim’in etkisinde şi-
ire başlamış, ancak kendi kimliğini ispat edebilmek adına onu reddetmiş,
yepyeni bir şiir örneği vermiştir. Bununla birlikte halef şair olarak selefinin
izlerinin zaman zaman ortaya çıkmasına engel olamamıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Selef Şair, Halef Şair, gelenek, ret, kimlik.
ABSTARCT
Orhan Veli Against Ahmet Haşim
Orhan Veli Kanık is the Pioneer and the most important poet of the new
era called First Modern or Bizzare Poetry (Garip Şiiri) reflecting an im-
portant refracting and changing in the history of Turkish poetry. He started
writing his early poems under the influence of the modern poets such as
Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Ahmet Haşim, Ahmet Muhip Dranas, Ahmet Hamdi
Tanpınar and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, but later he changed his idea and
understanding of art and poetry of those poets whom he considered as
the representative of the tardition (classical poetry). The pomes written
by Kanık was called “garip” (bizzare) during that time by other poets. In
* Dr. Özlem Nemutlu, Celal Bayar Üniversitesi, Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi, Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü, Yeni
Türk Edebiyatı Ana Bilim Dal
our opinion, while he was writing his new peoms rejecting the old or clas-
sic poems of Yahya Kemal and others, he took into consideration Ahmet
Haşim’s understanding of poetry. In a way, we can consider Orhan Veli’s
poems as the result or product of the reckoning with Ahmet Haşim’s poems.
In this context, Harold Blooms’ concepts taking place in “The Influence of
Anxiety” can be used for the explanation of the Orhan Veli’s place against
Haşim. When we apply Blooms’s terminology into Orhan Veli’s poems,
we can see that Orhan Veli started writing poetry under the influnece of
his Pioneer/ initiator poet Ahmet Haşim, but later in order for him to proof
his identity and personality in Turkish poetry, he has rejected his initiator,
Haşim and his understandingi of poetry, and brought about a new and ori-
ginal poetry samples. Together with this rejectoin, he as a follower poet
was not be able to escape from the emanation of influence of his Pioneer/
initiator poet Haşim from time to time, too.
Key Words: Precursor Poet, Later Poet, tradition, rejection, identity.
Orhan Veli, Türk şiir tarihinde büyük bir kırılmanın ve köklü bir deği-
şikliğin ifadesi olan Garip akımının Oktay Rifat ve Melih Cevdet’le birlik-
te üç temsilcisinden biri ve en ateşli savunucusudur. Bundan dolayıdır ki,
akımın poetikası niteliğinde olan Garip önsözünü yazan Orhan Veli olur.
Sanatçı, gerek söz konusu önsözü yazarken gerekse benimsedikleri şiir
görüşüne uygun “garip” tarzdaki şiirleri kaleme alırken, eser verdikleri dö-
neme hâkim olan ve bir nevi aşılmaz kurallarla âdeta statükolaşan edebiyat
geleneğini yıkmak istiyordu. Orhan Veli ve arkadaşlarının ilk edebî ürün-
lerini vermeye başladıkları sıralarda Türk şiirinde başta hececiler olmak
üzere, Fransız sembolistleri ve parnesyenlerin izinde aruz vezniyle imajist
şiirler yazan Ahmet Haşim, Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar,
Ahmet Muhip Dranas, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek gibi isimlerin oldukça etkili
olduğunu görmekteyiz. Bu isimlerin yanı sıra kendine özgü bir tarzda aruz
vezniyle yazan Âkif’i, eski şöhretlerini yitirmekle birlikte hâla yazmaya
devam eden Cenap’ı ve Hâmit’i de sayabiliriz. Burada putları kırmak üze-
re yola çıkan Nazım Hikmet ve Ercümend Behzad’ın farklı yollarla ede-
biyat tarihimizde vezinsiz şiir yazma geleneğini başlatmak suretiyle Garip
akımının doğuşunu hazırladıklarını da hatırlatmalıyız1. Ancak bütün bu
isimler ve onların temsil ettikleri eğilimler içerisinde devrin edebiyat dün-
yasında belirleyici olan Hececiler ile Ahmet Haşim ve Yahya Kemal’dir.
1
Bu konuda bkz. İnci Enginün, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Edebiyatı, Dergâh Yayınları, İstanbul , (Enginün,
Garip hareketinden önce şiirimizde hüküm süren şahsiyetleri ve anlayışları “Eskiler”, “Memleket Edebiyatı” ve
“Öz Şiir” başlıkları altında ele alır. ss. ) Hakan Sazyek, Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk Şiirinde Garip Hare-
keti, İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara , s, Asım Bezirci, Orhan Kanık, Eti Yayınevi, İstanbul , 79 s.
şiirini, kendinden önce hiç yazılmamış orijinal şiiri yazmaya mahkûm olan
denemesinde tecessüm ettirmekten yine de kendini alıkoyamaz7. Bir başka
ifadeyle Terry Eagleton’un da belirttiği gibi, bir şair, kendisini kısırlaştıran
öncü güçlü şairin şiiriyle mücadeleye girer ve onu yeniden yazmaya ve
yorumlamaya çalışmak suretiyle kendini ispatlamaya çalışır8. Bloom, “ge-
ciken şair”in, “öncü veya selef” şairin şiirini altı şekilde bozup değiştire-
bileceğini belirttikten ve bu “bozup değiştirme” süreçlerinin söz sanatları
ve Freud’un savunma mekanizmaları arasındaki ilişkiye değindikten son-
ra söz konusu mekanizmalarla Kabalistlerin İbrani İncili’nin yorumunda
kullandıkları araçlar arasında bir benzerlik bulmuştur. Bloom, “Clinamen,
Tessera, Kenosis, Demonisierung, Askesis, Apophrades”9 terimleriyle ad-
landırdığı altı çeşit tahriften bahseder. Adı geçen savunma ve tahrif meka-
nizmaları, bir nevi kendinden önceki Hececilerle ve konumuzla ilgi olması
açısından en yoğun olarak Ahmet Haşim’in şiiriyle hesaplaşmaya giren
Orhan Veli’nin şiirinde de –bütün aşamaları ve türleriyle olmasa da– karşı-
mıza çıkmaktadır. Orhan Veli, bilhassa Ahmet Haşim karşısında kendisini
“gecikmiş” bir şair olarak görmektedir. Haşim, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar,
Ahmet Muhip Dranas, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek gibi önde gelen şairlerin,
Atatürk devrinin eleştiri otoritesi olarak kabul edilen Nurullah Ataç’ın da
büyük beğeni ve hayranlığını toplayan bir şairdir. Orhan Veli, devrin bir-
çok şairini etkileyen Haşim’le hem düz yazılarında –bunlara Garip önsö-
zünü de ilave edebiliriz- hem de şiirlerinde zaman zaman tavrını gizlemek-
le birlikte bir hesaplaşmaya girer. Bu bağlamda Orhan Veli’nin Haşim’in
şiirini aşma sürecini:
I. Şiirlerinde,
II. Düz yazılarında olmak üzere iki temel başlık altında ele alabiliriz.
Söz konusu sürecin nasıl tezahür ettiğini görmek için öncelikle şiirleri-
ne bakalım. Hakan Sazyek, Garip şairlerinin bilinen edebî mekteplerin ve
toplulukların aksine önce poetika ile değil de eserle, şiirle rakiplerinin kar-
şısına çıkmalarını, oldukça anlamlı bulur ve bu tavrı, mevcut şiir anlayışını
7
Harold Bloom, ’te yayımlanan ‘The Influence of Anxiety’ adlı kitabıyla söz konusu bakış açısının ede-
biyat tarihlerinin yazımında da etkili olacağını iddia etmektedir. Bkz. Terry Eagleton, Edebiyat Kuramı, Çev.:
Esen Tarım, Ayrıntı Yay., İstanbul , s.
8
Bkz. ag.e., s.
9
Bunlar sırasıyla, “Clinamen, temel aykırılık, öncü, selef şairin şiirini kötü okuma, onun yönelmediği noktaya
yönelme, hedef değiştirme; Tessera, önceki şiiri tamamlama ya da onu farklı tez oluşturacak şekilde kullanmak;
Kenosis, öncü şairin şiirini değersizleştirmek için onunla bütün bağlantıları kesiyor gözükme; Demonisierung,
öncü şairin şahsında, bütün edebiyat tarihini de içine alan bir anti melek kurgusu, şeytanîleştirme, böylece
ondaki üstün olarak kabul edilen nitelikleri bütün edebiyat tarihine mal ederek öncü şairin değerini düşürme;
Askesis, geleneksel vecde gelme tekniklerini sınırlandırma, öncü şairin şiirinde eksiklikler bulma; Apophrades
de ne yapılırsa yapılsın eserde öncü şairin etkisinin tamamen yok edilemeyeceği, tıpkı eski Atina inanışlarında
rastladığımız ölülerin ruhlarının belli günlerde evlerine dönmesi gibi öncü şairin halefin şiirinde varlığını bir
şekilde göstereceği anlamlarına gelmektedir. Bu son süreçte geciken şair, kendi kimliğini de bir bakıma bulmuş
olur. Çıraklık bitmiştir. Söz konusu tahrif mekanizmaları için bkz. (Almanca) www. seafoodplus.info
yıkmak için somut bir eserle çıkarak daha etkili olma, geleneksel tutumu
benimseyenlerce eleştirilmekten kaçınma ve bir edebî hareket, bir okul
olarak başlama amacını taşımama gibi sebeplere bağlar Gerçi durağan-
lığa ve kuralcılığa dayanan mektep anlayışını ve kendilerinin bir mektep
olarak görülmesini, sosyal hayatta olduğu gibi şiirde de sürekli gelişmeyi
ve değişmeyi benimseyen Garipçiler kabul etmeyeceklerdir. Ancak onla-
KARADENİZ ARAŞTIRMALARI<br />
BALKAN, KAFKAS, DOĞU AVRUPA VE ANADOLU İNCELEMELERİ DERGİSİ<br />
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K<strong>ara</strong>deniz Araştırmaları<br />
Journal of theBlack SeaStudies<br />
K<strong>ara</strong>M Yayınıdır<br />
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İçindekiler / Contents<br />
1 TurkishForeignPolicytowardtheBosnianWar<br />
(‐): A Constructivist Analysis<br />
Türkiye ve Bosna Savaşı (): İnşaci<br />
Kuram Çerçevesinde Bir Analiz<br />
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
19 The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in<br />
Europe’sSouthernGasCorridor<br />
Avrupa’nın Güney Gaz Koridorunda AGRI’nin<br />
Stratejik Ayrıcalığı<br />
LászlóMarácz<br />
29 ХодИсторииВспятьНеОбратить<br />
Tarihin Akışı Geri Döndürülemez<br />
Константин Думаа<br />
51 XVI. Yüzyıl Anadolusunda Dış Göçler: Şarkiyan<br />
Migration in the 16th Century Anatolia:<br />
Şarkiyan<br />
Alpaslan Demir<br />
67 XVII. Yüzyıl Macar Millet Anlayışının İdeolojik<br />
İçeriği Açısından Bir Örnek: Kuruz Hareketi Ve<br />
Askeri Potansiyeli<br />
An Example for the Ideological Contents of the<br />
Hungarian National Idea in the 17thCentury<br />
Was the Kuruc Movement and Its Military Force<br />
Hüseyin Şevket Çağatay Çapraz<br />
85 Mazlumların Kuramcısı ve Stratejisti: Sultan<br />
Galiyev<br />
Theorist and Strategist of Underdogs: Sultan<br />
Galiyev<br />
Demirhan Fahri Erdem<br />
Yusuf Ziya Yozgadî ve Temaşâ‐yı Celâl‐i Hüdâ<br />
Adlı Eseri<br />
Yusuf Ziya Yozgadîand His WorkTemaşâyi<br />
Celâli Hüdâ<br />
Yunus Özger<br />
Sıkıntı Kavramı ve Bir Küçük Burjuvanın Gençlik<br />
Yılları Romanı<br />
Concept of BoredomandtheNovelYoungDays of a<br />
LittleBourgeois<br />
Oğuz Öcal<br />
Kitap Değerlendirme / BookReviews<br />
Robert Dankoff: Seyyahı Âlem Evliyâ Çelebi’nin<br />
Dünyaya Bakışı<br />
Yahya Kemal Taştan<br />
K<strong>ara</strong>deniz Araştırmaları Dergisi 7. Cilt Dizini<br />
Index of the Volume VII of "K<strong>ara</strong>deniz Araştırmaları"<br />
Yayın İlkeleri<br />
EditorialPrinciples
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE BOSNIAN<br />
WAR (‐): A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS<br />
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun *<br />
Özet<br />
Bu çalışmada Türkiye'deki k<strong>ara</strong>r alıcıların Bosna Savaşı'na yönelik<br />
izledikleri dış politika analiz edilmektedir. Araştırma sorusu Türkiye'nin o<br />
dönemdeki mevcut iç ve dış sorunlarına karşın nasıl olup da aktif bir politika<br />
izleyebildiğidir. Bu çalışma yeni bir devlet kimliği <strong>ara</strong>yışı sürecinin bu<br />
politikada etkili olduğunu savunmaktadır.<br />
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Bosna, Balkanlar, dış politika, devlet kimliği<br />
Abstract<br />
The main aim of this essay is to examine the policy adopted by Turkish<br />
decision makers toward the Bosnian War between and The<br />
puzzling question is that why Turkey attempted to play an active role during<br />
the war in Bosnia in spite of its internal and external problems at the time. This<br />
study argues that the search for a new state identity in the post-‐Cold War era<br />
provided the key to understand Turkish foreign policy towards the Bosnian<br />
conflict. It is argued that by developing an active attitude toward the conflict,<br />
Ank<strong>ara</strong> was in fact trying to reformulate its former identity, which had been<br />
constructed during the Cold War. Turkey was trying to prove that it was still<br />
important for Western security in the new era. The study shows that the wars<br />
of Yugoslav dissolution witnessed many speeches of Turkish leaders declaring<br />
the greatness of the country. This dominant discourse was accompanied by an<br />
active foreign policy by the Turkish leaders. At the time Ank<strong>ara</strong> started many<br />
diplomatic initiatives to bring the Bosnian issue to the attention of the<br />
international community. This study argues that the discourse and foreign<br />
policy during the Bosnian War were caused by Turkish leaders’ desire to show<br />
Turkey’s still lasting geopolitical signifance to the world.<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Keywords: Turkey,, Bosnia, Balkans, foreign policy, state identity.<br />
This article examines the policy adopted by Turkish decision makers<br />
toward the Bosnian War between and The puzzling question is<br />
why Turkey attempted to play an active role during the war in Bosnia in<br />
spite of its internal and external problems? This study argues that the<br />
search for a new state identity by the policy makers provides the key to<br />
* Doç. Dr., Başkent Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Ulusl<strong>ara</strong>rası İlişkiler Bölümü Eskişehir Yolu<br />
km. Bağlıca Ank<strong>ara</strong>. [email protected]<br />
K<strong>ara</strong>deniz Araştırmaları • Kış • Sayı 28 • 1-‐18
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
understanding Turkish foreign policy toward the problems in former<br />
Yugoslavia. It is argued that by developing an active attitude toward the<br />
conflict, Ank<strong>ara</strong> was in fact trying to reformulate its former identity, which<br />
had been constructed during the Cold War. Turkey was trying to prove that<br />
it was still important for Western security in the new era. It was trying to<br />
project its new identity as a regional power, but it wanted to maintain its<br />
Western-‐oriented foreign policy as well. Its active policy in the Balkans can<br />
be attributed to its search for a reformulation of its former identity in<br />
accordance with new international circumstances.<br />
The article will, first, look at the position of Turkey in the new<br />
conditions of international politics in the post-‐Cold War era. Second it will<br />
examine the theoretical approach that is believed to be useful to<br />
understand its foreign policy toward the Bosnian case. Third it will consider<br />
Ank<strong>ara</strong>’s approach toward the outbreak of the violence in Yugoslav<br />
territories, mainly in Slovenia and Croatia. Fourth its attitude during the<br />
Bosnian War that was the longest lasting and the bloodiest conflict in<br />
Europe after the Second World War will be analysed. Fifth and last the main<br />
findings of the research will be summarized.<br />
TURKEY IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER<br />
The collapse of the Cold War led to a new perception of Turkey in the West;<br />
Turkey, which had considered herself an insep<strong>ara</strong>ble part of the West<br />
during the Cold War, found itself in the position of an “awkward partner”. 1<br />
The basic question was what kind of role Turkey would play in the new<br />
conditions of global politics. Would Turkey continue to be a part of the<br />
Western alliance or turn its face to the newly independent Turkic republics?<br />
However the Gulf crisis which erupted in and resulted in US-‐led war<br />
against Iraq changed the US perception of Turkey. 2 Due to the irredentist<br />
policy of Saddam Hussein Washington realized that Turkey’s regional role<br />
was still important for US national interests in the Middle East. The book<br />
entitled Turkey’s New Geopolitics from the Balkans to Western China 3<br />
published by the RAND Corporation, one of the most influential think tanks<br />
in the US, emphasized increasing role of Turkey. It was argued that Turkey<br />
1 Erik Cornell, Turkey in the 21st Century, Opportunities, Challenges, Threats (Britain: Curzon,<br />
), p. 3.<br />
2 For a discussion of the effect of the Gulf War on the US perception of Turkey please see<br />
Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ‘Dünya ve Türkiye’, in F. Sönmezoğlu (ed.), Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi<br />
(İstanbul: Der, ), p. <br />
3 Graham E. Fuller et. al., Turkey’s New Geopolitics from the Balkans to Western China (Boulder:<br />
Westview Press, ).<br />
2
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
become a regional power and the changes ensuing from the dissolution of<br />
the Soviet Union made Turkey a critical power. 4<br />
Philip Robins, meanwhile, maintained that Turkey’s strategic role in<br />
the new era decreased and increased at the same time. Though it lost the<br />
role that it had played during the Cold War, it became a regional player in<br />
the s by pursuing an active foreign policy in its neighborhood. 5 Robins<br />
argued that the US recognized the increasing importance of Turkey<br />
whereas Europe did not. It was also becoming clear that Turkey did not<br />
share the euphoria of Western countries about the Soviet dissolution.<br />
Turkey had difficulty adapting itself to the new norms on issues like human<br />
rights increasingly emphasized by the West.<br />
Another argument with regard to Turkey’s position in the new<br />
international system was concerned with whether Turkey was a security<br />
producing country or security consuming country. 6 Especially the member<br />
states of the European Union were of the opinion that Turkey was mostly a<br />
security consuming country leading to the commonly held belief that it did<br />
not deserve to be taken into the Union.<br />
In sum, while some observers maintained that Turkey became an<br />
important regional power in the new era by allying itself with the US, the<br />
sole superpower in the post-‐Cold War period, others suggested that<br />
Turkey’s global position was harmed by the end of the perceived Soviet<br />
threat. A main hypothesis of this study is that the new status of Turkey in<br />
world politics is rather different from its former role. Because Turkey was<br />
no longer a neighbor to one of the superpowers, the geostrategic<br />
importance of Turkey changed. This could best be observed in the changing<br />
Turkish perception of the European Union that concentrated all its energy<br />
in enlarging toward the Central and East European countries but excluding<br />
Turkey.<br />
Further, the transformation of external global dynamics was coupled<br />
with internal crises in Turkey as two important problems emerged which<br />
challenged the state identity of Turkey: Kurdish nationalism and religious<br />
fundamentalism. The PKK began its violent attacks in southeastern Turkey<br />
in Following the Gulf War, it also benefited from the authority<br />
vacuum in northern Iraq. After , it increased its attacks against Turkish<br />
security officials, as well as Kurdish civilians who were accused of being “on<br />
the side of the Turkish state”. The first half of the s saw the peak of<br />
PKK activities. During the same period the state identity of Turkey was<br />
4 For another evaluation of Turkey’s regional power role please see I. O. Lesser, ‘Turkey’s<br />
Strategic Options’, The International Spectator, Vol. 34 (), p. <br />
5 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (Seattle:<br />
University of Washington Press, ), p. <br />
6 Ali L. K<strong>ara</strong>osmanoğlu, ‘Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-‐Avrupa<br />
Birliği İlişkileri’, Doğu Batı, Vol. 4 (), p. <br />
3
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
challenged by another trend as well: religious fundamentalism<br />
ch<strong>ara</strong>cterized especially by an increasing number of votes for the Welfare<br />
Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Political Islam has been<br />
one of the main concerns of the Turkish political elite since the foundation<br />
of the Republic in The fact that the Welfare Party increased its share<br />
of votes at every election since local elections led to increasing<br />
apprehension 7 and the issue of political Islam (irtica) became more acute.<br />
In that context, it was not surprising that in the National Political Document<br />
of increasing political Islam was evaluated as “a serious danger” since<br />
it was seen as a threat to the secular system of the country 8 In brief, it was<br />
not only external challenges that Turkey had to face, but also serious<br />
internal problems, like Kurdish nationalism and political Islam.<br />
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK<br />
As states interact with each other they gain an identity for themselves and<br />
also attach an identity to the others. Certainly the international aspect of<br />
state identity is only one part of the whole picture: there are also domestic<br />
factors defining what kind of entity a state would become. When one<br />
compares the relative weight of domestic and international factors for<br />
determination of state identity, for Wendt, state identity is to a great extent<br />
established by the international system. 9 But the important thing at this<br />
point is the significance of the concept of “state identity” for international<br />
politics. First a definition of the concept is needed: state identity consists of<br />
“a set of beliefs about nature and purpose of state expressed in public<br />
articulations of state actions and ideals”. 10 It is basically about the definition<br />
of a state’s rights, obligations and responsibilities and also of the meaning<br />
attributed to other actors. In a way it is about setting boundaries between<br />
oneself and others: 11 Who are you relative to others? And who are they<br />
relative to yourself and themselves?<br />
States have in fact two kinds of identities: internal and external. While<br />
internal identity refers to the set of understandings within the boundaries<br />
7 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, The Challenge to Europe and the United States<br />
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings, ), p. 55; İhsan D. Dağı, ‘Transformation of Islamic Political<br />
Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and the Westernization’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6<br />
(), p. <br />
8 Gencer Özcan, ‘Doksanlarda Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının<br />
Artan Etkisi’, in G. Özcan and Ş. Kut (eds.), En Uzun On Yıl, Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış<br />
Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar (İstanbul: Büke, ), p. <br />
9 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University<br />
Press, ), p. ‐<br />
10 Marc Lynch, ‘Abandoning Iraq: Jordan’s Alliances and the Politics of State Identity’, Security<br />
Studies, Vol. 8 (Winter ‐, Spring ), p. <br />
11 Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Introduction: Tracing the Influence<br />
of Identity on Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, Vol. 8 (Winter ‐, Spring ), p. VIII.<br />
4
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
of that state among its constituent parts, external identity stands for a<br />
state’s place among others in international politics. 12 The former can also<br />
be labelled as national identity. It is the latter concept that will basically be<br />
used in this study. Therefore, whenever state identity is mentioned, what is<br />
in fact meant is the external identity. There is an important relationship<br />
between state identity and foreign policy: 13 one of the significant ways for<br />
states to acquire a new identity or protect the previous one is through<br />
foreign policy. Their interactions with other states are a way of getting<br />
themselves accepted as part of a certain international community and being<br />
respected. Especially during the process of identity formulation or<br />
reformulation, foreign policy is a key instrument for decision makers to<br />
realize their goals. The constructivist approach is therefore expected to<br />
have more explaining power during the periods of new identity creation. 14<br />
The Turkish state played the primary role in the articulation of its<br />
interests and formulation of foreign policy during the Balkan wars of the<br />
s. In order to understand what kind of goals it pursued, we first have<br />
to look at its state identity, i.e. how the political leadership perceived rights,<br />
obligations and responsibilities of its own country and other countries in<br />
world politics? In the case of Turkey, political leaders since Atatürk have<br />
seen Turkey’s place as in the Western world. Atatürk’s radical reforms were<br />
all based on the Western model. The foreign policy of modern Turkey can<br />
be understood as a process of developing ever increasing and closer<br />
relations with the West and as an attempt to be recognized as part of them.<br />
Turkey was also a member of the Western bloc during the bipolar era and<br />
contributed to the defence of the West against the perceived threat from the<br />
Soviet Union.<br />
Since the wars in the former Yugoslav territories occurred at the very<br />
time when Turkish state identity was questioned, constructivism can be<br />
used as a theoretical framework in order to understand whether it would<br />
provide us with a better tool to make sense of Turkish foreign policy.<br />
During this formative or reformative period, Turkey was expected to use its<br />
foreign policy to perpetuate the external identities that it had acquired<br />
during the bipolar world order.<br />
How can one analyse whether the identity of Turkey played an<br />
important role in its foreign policy? As constructivist theory argues, this can<br />
be best demonstrated during the formative or reformative period of that<br />
particular identity. Since the s brought intense identity challenges to<br />
12 Paul A. Kowert, ‘National Identity: Inside and Out’, Security Studies, Vol. 8 (Winter ‐<br />
, Spring ), p. 4.<br />
13 David Campbell, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity<br />
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, ), p. <br />
14 J. T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, Vol.<br />
50 (), p. <br />
5
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
Ank<strong>ara</strong>, our case study provides us with an important test for constructivist<br />
theory. In order to decide whether state identity was effective in<br />
formulating foreign policy, we should examine the following questions: Was<br />
there any particular kind of identity that policy makers repeatedly stressed<br />
upon in explaining their country’s place in the world? Was the foreign<br />
policy behavior in accordance with the discourse that was emphasized? Did<br />
the attitude comply with the state identity? Did any behaviour or discourse<br />
in opposition to the claimed state identity lead to criticism within state? 15 If<br />
it can be observed that there has been a dominant discourse on a certain<br />
state identity, that Turkey acted in compliance with it, and that any<br />
incompliance was faced with criticism, then we can argue for the validity of<br />
constructivist thought in our case study.<br />
TURKEY AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA<br />
In fact the emerging conflict in Bosnia did not seem to have a direct impact<br />
upon Turkish security considerations in the short or medium term.<br />
Geographically, Bosnia was not in the close neighborhood of Turkey and<br />
despite all speculations that war in the Balkans would lead to a Turkish-‐<br />
Greek war, in a realistic perspective, it did not seem probable that the<br />
conflict would spread to Turkey in the foreseeable future. Philip Robins<br />
argues that in fact it was because of identity and “soft politics” that Turkey<br />
became interested in Bosnia 16 In that context, it can be stated that Turkish<br />
decision makers did not want the conflict in Bosnia to be perceived as a war<br />
between Islam and Christianity. They were also concerned that if the<br />
conflict last too long, Turkish public opinions’ view about Europe can<br />
increasingly be negative. Moreover, the possibility of a new migration flow<br />
to Turkey created apprehension on the part of the policy makers. In other<br />
words, Turkey was interested in the Bosnian conflict not necessariy<br />
because of “hard security” issues, but mostly because of “soft security”<br />
issues including identity and migration.<br />
One of the international platforms that Turkey considered as<br />
important to bring the suffering of the Bosnians to the agenda was the<br />
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). A common approach among<br />
the countries whose populations consist mostly of Muslims toward the<br />
Bosnian problem would attract the attention of international organizations<br />
like the UN and get them to take more assertive actions. When the Bosnian<br />
war started, Turkey was the term president of the OIC. Thus, it used this<br />
opportunity to call an extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers in<br />
15 Thomas Banchoff, ‘German Identity and European Integration’, European Journal of<br />
International Relations, Vol. 5 (), p. <br />
16 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, pp. ‐<br />
6
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
İstanbul. The meeting of foreign ministers from 15 OIC member countries<br />
was held in İstanbul on ‐18 June in which the UN was called on to<br />
take all necessary measures, including military, against Serbs. That was in<br />
fact the position Turkey was already supporting. The Turkish initiative of<br />
convening an extraordinary meeting of the OIC was important because it<br />
transmitted to the world how the countries with Muslim populations<br />
perceived the Bosnian war. Via that meeting, the OIC gained an important<br />
function and could, hence, revitalize its role after a long period. 17<br />
Turkey launched another initiative on Bosnia in August that<br />
included both diplomatic and military measures. Turkey presented the<br />
“Action Plan” to the permanent representatives of the UNSC and asked them<br />
to implement the measures. The diplomatic part of the plan consisted of the<br />
following proposals: a) Serbian militants should give up their weapons and<br />
hand over their heavy weaponry to the UN personnel within 48 hours. b)<br />
UN officials should be given the right to enter Serbian prisons and take<br />
control over them. c) The UNSC should request Serbia to stop giving aid to<br />
Serbian militias. d) Serbian militias guilty of committing massacres should<br />
be tried in international courts.<br />
The second part of the plan comprised military precautions in which<br />
Turkey proposed to the UNSC members that if the diplomatic measures<br />
were not accepted by the Serbian side or if the measures failed to achieve<br />
the planned aims, then selected Serbian military targets should be bombed<br />
from the air. Foreign Minister Çetin emphasized that the most important<br />
part of the Action Plan was its military part: If other measures did not stop<br />
the Serbian aggression, then a military intervention would be conducted.<br />
Turkey’s Action Plan was one of the most important proposals for putting<br />
an end to the violence in Bosnia in the early phase of the war. 18<br />
From the end of May onward, Turkey adopted a new attitude<br />
concerning any military intervention in Bosnia. Since there was no sign of<br />
ending the war or reducing its extent, and since the international<br />
community did not show a definite will to deter the aggressor either,<br />
Turkey decided to back an international military operation against Serbian<br />
targets. The intervention should take place within the framework of an<br />
international organization, most probably the UNSC. However, the<br />
government in Ank<strong>ara</strong> emphasized its opposition to any unilateral move<br />
that would not solve the problem. In this way the government distanced<br />
itself clearly from Özal’s attitude.<br />
In the meantime, Turkey was supporting the diplomatic initiatives of<br />
the EC to provide a peaceful solution to the Bosnian conflict. Turkey was<br />
17 Concerning İstanbul meeting of the OIC see Soysal and Kut, Dağılan Yugoslavya, p. 23<br />
18 Şule Kut, ‘Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye’nin Bosna-‐Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası:<br />
‐’, in Sönmezoğlu (ed.), Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, p. <br />
7
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
invited to the London Conference that was held on ‐27 August <br />
Although Turkey was neither one of the parties to the conflict nor a<br />
member of the EC, it was asked to take part in the conference. In Turkey the<br />
invitation was considered as an important indication of its increasing<br />
importance in the region, its active foreign policy, and its increasing<br />
economic and political weight. It was also a result of the role Turkey played<br />
in the framework of the OIC. In other words, as long as Turkey launched its<br />
own initiatives and developed an assertive policy, it was gaining<br />
importance in the European framework. Its improving status in Balkan<br />
affairs and impact upon the regional actors and Islamic countries made<br />
Europe understand how important and powerful Turkey was. On the other<br />
hand, one should keep in mind that at the time when Turkey was trying to<br />
deal with this heavy foreign policy agenda, it had to continue its struggle<br />
against the PKK as well. Turkey, which tried to keep its security against<br />
increasing PKK attacks and resurfacing Kurdish nationalism in its internal<br />
politics, had to keep its attention on the violent conflict in the Balkans. In<br />
spite of that, from the very beginning of the Bosnian War it tried to follow<br />
an active foreign policy. One of the important reasons behind this assertive<br />
foreign policy was the country’s aim to maintain its Western state identity.<br />
Turkish decisionmakers firmly believed that Ank<strong>ara</strong> was still important for<br />
European security and it could prove its importance to the international<br />
community through its policies during the Bosnian War. As Turkey took<br />
new initiatives and supported heavy-‐handed measures, the West seemed to<br />
understand that Ank<strong>ara</strong>’s role was inevitable in the solution of the conflict<br />
on the European continent. In other words, Turkey’s Western-‐oriented<br />
state identity influenced its formulation of national interest and foreign<br />
policy attitudes. Despite all its internal problems Turkey tried to propose<br />
new initiatives for the solution of the conflict in order to maintain its former<br />
identity.<br />
Another important initiative of Turkey on the Bosnian issue was the<br />
convening of a Balkan Conference in İstanbul on 25 November As the<br />
violence was going on in Bosnia without any sign of reaching a ceasefire or<br />
an agreement among the parties, there was the growing fear that the<br />
conflict would spread to other regions in the Balkans, especially to Kosovo<br />
and Macedonia. Çetin pointed out that there was a serious danger of the<br />
outbreak of a Balkan war soon and that this was the greatest problem the<br />
world was faced with. Turkey had two fundamental aims in gathering a<br />
regional conference: a) to emphasize once again the necessity of military<br />
intervention, b) to attract attention to the possibility of the war spreading.<br />
The Turkish Foreign Minister emphasized that Turkey decided to take<br />
8
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
initiative without waiting for the world to find a solution. 19 Regional<br />
countries and some neighboring states took part in the conference:<br />
Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and<br />
Romania. The Balkan Conference could be considered as an important<br />
diplomatic initiative of Turkey which aimed to get the international<br />
community to act more assertively to stop the violent incidents in the<br />
Balkans and prevent the beginning of a Balkan war. Turkey was both using<br />
its contacts within the OIC and trying to play a regional leadership role in<br />
order to assert more influence in the international arena.<br />
When it became evident that the international actors did not intend to<br />
conduct a military operation against Serbs in the short-‐term for a variety of<br />
reasons, Turkish leaders decided to start a new initiative to stop the arms<br />
embargo against Bosniaks. They argued that an embargo against the whole<br />
Yugoslavia was in fact harming the Bosniak side since Serbia already had<br />
enough stocks of weaponry and ammunition and was in a position to send<br />
them to the Bosnian Serbs. Serbia could also break the embargo and get<br />
new weapons from other countries. Turkey concentrated its efforts on the<br />
US administration, Islamic countries, and international organizations to lift<br />
the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. Foreign Minister Çetin<br />
argued that the arms embargo led to a situation in which it became<br />
impossible for the Bosniaks to defend themselves; thus the lifting of the<br />
embargo was a moral necessity for the world. At the OIC Summit held in<br />
K<strong>ara</strong>chi in April , Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,<br />
and Malaysia put forward a joint proposal for lifting the embargo against<br />
Bosnia-‐Hercegovina. The proposal was accepted unanimously at the<br />
Summit, in which the OIC member countries called upon the UNSC to take<br />
all necessary measures, including military ones, as soon as possible.<br />
An important question in this regard is whether Turkey sent any<br />
weapons to Bosnia violating the embargo. Accordimg to Turkish press<br />
reports when Turkish journalists asked Foreign Minister Çetin whether<br />
there would be any weapons transfer from Turkey, the Minister remained<br />
silent. However, the former Turkish Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş made public<br />
in late that during his term there were secret weapons deliveries to<br />
Bosnia. However 90 % of these weapons were seized by Croatia. 20<br />
Remembering that Turkey traditionally tries to maintain its cautious<br />
attitude toward any regional conflict, one should state that sending<br />
weapons to the Bosniak side was a good example of how Turkey deviated<br />
from its traditional foreign policy.<br />
19 The original text of Hikmet Çetin’s statement is the following: “Türkiye dünyadan medet<br />
ummadan inisiyatif almaya k<strong>ara</strong>r vermiştir.” Quoted in Selin Çağlayan, ‘Ank<strong>ara</strong>’nın kâbusu:<br />
Balkan Savaşı…’, Hürriyet, 23 November <br />
20 ‘Bosna’ya silah gönderdik’, Hürriyet, 4 December <br />
9
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
As the violence between Bosniaks and Croats started in , Turkey<br />
proved itself to be one of the few countries in which both warring sides had<br />
trust. Turkish mediation between the two sides was welcomed. 21 and even<br />
both Bosniak and Croatian leadership asked for it. In their press meeting<br />
Bosniaks and Croats pointed out that whenever their negotiations were<br />
stuck, they applied to the mediation of Foreign Minister Çetin, and only with<br />
his initiatives could the bilateral talks go on. Both sides expressed their<br />
appreciation of Turkey’s role. Çetin also visited S<strong>ara</strong>jevo twice in order to<br />
attend the Bosniak-‐Croat negotiations. By maintaining contact and friendly<br />
relations with the Croat side as well, Turkey might also have attempted to<br />
distance itself from the image of protectors of only the Muslims.<br />
Turkey’s relations with the Bosnian Croat side and the Croatian<br />
leadership were also one of the highlights of the visit of Turkish Prime<br />
Minister Tansu Çiller and her Pakistani counterpart, Benazir Butto, to<br />
S<strong>ara</strong>jevo and Zagreb in February The two leaders’ visit to Bosnia-‐<br />
Hercegovina was important in several respects. It was the first high level<br />
visit after that of French President Francois Mitterrand. Moreover, as<br />
Western-‐oriented female leaders, their visit attracted the attention of the<br />
world media, thus increasing the international public awareness of the<br />
suffering in the region. Çiller and Butto made public the Decl<strong>ara</strong>tion of<br />
S<strong>ara</strong>jevo, in which they stated the aim of their visit as “humanitarian”, urged<br />
the whole world to help stop the destruction of Bosnia, and requested the<br />
UNSC to implement all its resolutions. They also pointed out that the<br />
“unfair” weapons embargo should be ended. In Zagreb, Çiller met Croatian<br />
leader Tudjman, who asked her to host a summit between Croats and<br />
Bosniaks and convince Izetbegociv to attend. This was also a sign of how<br />
Croatia perceived Turkey as a bridge to get into contact with the Bosniak<br />
leadership.<br />
As a result of its mediating role between Bosnian Croats and<br />
Bosniaks Turkey’s contribution to the agreement on a ceasefire in February<br />
and creation of a federation between them the following month could<br />
not be rejected. Turkey proved itself one of the peace brokers together with<br />
the Washington administration which also appreciated Turkey’s role by<br />
inviting it to the ceremony of the signing of the federation agreement.<br />
Invitation of Turkey could be considered as an indication of its weight in the<br />
region and how its role acquired importance during the Bosnian conflict. It<br />
also showed that the Western world was aware of Turkey’s position<br />
regarding the developments and the international community saw Turkey<br />
within “the Balkan equation”.<br />
21 İlhan Uzgel, ‘Doksanlarda Türkiye İçin Bir İşbirliği ve Rekabet Alanı Ol<strong>ara</strong>k Balkanlar’, in<br />
Gencer Özcan & Şule Kut, eds., En Uzun On Yıl (İstanbul: Boyut, ), p. ‐<br />
10
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
Moreover, it was not just the regional actors, but also the international<br />
actors that were seeking Turkish support in their attempt to find a peaceful<br />
solution. Lord Owen, a UN representative, and Thorwald Stoltenberg, who<br />
replaced Vance in May as EC mediator, paid an official visit to Turkey<br />
and asked Turkey to use its influence over the Bosniaks. Owen stated that<br />
the demands of Bosniaks for an outlet to the sea and more territory were<br />
right in essence, however for a stable peace the parties should come to an<br />
agreement. Turkish Foreign Minister Çetin stated that Turkey did not play a<br />
concrete mediation role; however, he would contact Izetbegovic as soon as<br />
possible to provide peace. He also added that Turkey would support<br />
Izetbegovic’s policy to the end.<br />
While trying to convince the international community to act more<br />
forcefully, Turkey also made sure that it was ready to take part in all<br />
military operations to provide peace and order in Bosnia. The UNSC<br />
accepted Resolution allowing NATO planes to attack Serbian war<br />
planes that would try to violate the no-‐fly zone, and NATO aircraft began to<br />
implement the decision on April 12, As a response, Turkey expressed<br />
its readiness to join the NATO action. After NATO’s invitation, 18 Turkish F-‐<br />
16 planes were sent to the region to monitor the no-‐fly zone. NATO’s<br />
request for Turkey to send its aircraft was considered “a great success of<br />
Ank<strong>ara</strong>” and “a great source of prestige” in the Turkish press.<br />
Turkish Foreign Minister Çetin, who played a critical role in the<br />
formulation of Turkey’s Bosnian policy, resigned in July During his<br />
term he supported an active but multilateral policy toward the Bosnian<br />
dispute and did not pay any credit to those who were asking for unilateral<br />
military action from Turkey. Before leaving his job he stated the following:<br />
“Turkey was suddenly faced with many problems that all needed Turkey’s<br />
attention. Thanks to Turkey’s initiatives in several issues it was understood<br />
that Turkey was a great state whose opinions were respected.” On Bosnia<br />
he stated:<br />
Turkey did everything that was needed. I myself went to S<strong>ara</strong>jevo<br />
four times under fire. We sent a huge amount of humanitarian aid.<br />
Before the problem intensified, we launched an action plan in August<br />
If that plan had been implemented, the problem would not have<br />
come to the point today. Although everybody stated that it was<br />
impossible, Turkey sent peacekeeping soldiers. 22<br />
Çetin’s remarks pointed out that in the post-‐Cold War era Turkey tried<br />
to find policies to the problems in its neighborhood. He also stressed that<br />
thanks to its initiatives, the international actors appreciated Turkey and its<br />
greatness. The statements of the Turkish Foreign Minister could be<br />
22 Barçın Yinanç, ‘Hiçbirşeyi daha kötü bırakmadım’, Milliyet, 30 July (Translated from<br />
Turkish by the author)<br />
11
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
regarded as a reaction to the claims that Turkey lost its former strategic<br />
importance. Therefore, Turkish attempts to provide solutions to the<br />
conflicts could be considered as a way of proving Turkey’s importance in<br />
the new era.<br />
In order to increase its support among both Turkish decision makers<br />
and the public, Bosniak leadership tried to emphasize their similarities with<br />
Turkey and the Turkish people. When Demirel wanted to visit S<strong>ara</strong>jevo in<br />
July , for his stay Bosniaks prepared the house of an Ottoman Pasha,<br />
Topal Recep Pasha, who had served during the reign of Kanuni Sultan<br />
Süleyman. By that gesture, the common history between Turks and<br />
Bosniaks was emphasized and the Ottoman heritage in Bosnia was<br />
remembered. Furthermore, Bosniak leaders were trying to find similarities<br />
between their struggle and the Turkish War of Independence, thus<br />
attempting to get more support from Turkey. The Bosnian Ambassador to<br />
Turkey, Hayrettin Somun, pointed out that they would show the same<br />
heroism as the Turks had already shown in their War of Independence and<br />
win their independence by fighting.<br />
From the beginning of August onward the US intensified its<br />
efforts to find a solution to the Bosnian crisis. The Washington<br />
administration looked for Turkish support, especially in convincing the<br />
Bosnian side to agree to a peace deal. Since the US government was aware<br />
of the fact that Ank<strong>ara</strong> could exert its influence over the Bosnian leadership,<br />
it sought Turkey’s help in that regard. The National Security Advisor to the<br />
US President, Anthony Lake, visited Ank<strong>ara</strong> and informed the Turkish<br />
government about the new initiative of the US to find a solution to the<br />
Bosnian debacle.<br />
In September diplomatic traffic in Turkey concerning Bosnia was<br />
intensified by the visits of the US Vice Foreign Minister Richard Holbrooke,<br />
the Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Bosnian Foreign Minister<br />
Muhammet Sakirbey. In the trilateral talks in Ank<strong>ara</strong>, Holbrooke tried to<br />
make use of Turkish mediation to encourage the Bosnian side to be more<br />
flexible on the peace deal. Turkey repeated the importance of keeping<br />
Bosnia-‐Hercegovina’s territorial integrity, which was also accepted by<br />
Holbrooke. The US Vice Foreign Minister also stressed that any peace<br />
implementation would need Turkey’s participation and Turkey played a<br />
critical role in the Bosnian crisis. Lake’s and Holbrooke’s visits were an<br />
important sign of Washington’s acknowledgement of Turkey’s role in the<br />
Bosnian crisis. The US wanted to inform Turkey about a possible peace plan<br />
and also to use its influence over the Bosnian leadership.<br />
After a Serbian attack killed 37 people in a marketplace in S<strong>ara</strong>jevo,<br />
NATO launched its biggest military campaign against the Bosnian Serb<br />
forces, which was called Operation Deliberate Force. Although after the last<br />
attack of the Bosnian Serb militants Çiller repeated Turkey’s willingness to<br />
12
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
send troops to Bosnia in case the international community would launch a<br />
joint operation, Turkish aircraft did not take part in the military campaign;<br />
however, they provided air cover for the planes conducting the bombing.<br />
Turkey was pleased that the Western world at last came to the conclusion<br />
that the war in Bosnia could not be stopped without a military intervention.<br />
That point was consistently repeated by Turkish decision makers since the<br />
inception of the war. Turkish leaders declared that they supported the<br />
decision to attack Serbian targets. Prime Minister Çiller stated that this was<br />
simply “a good beginning” and declared her hope that “…this will establish a<br />
good basis for discussing the international community’s peace plan and<br />
take it in hand.” In addition, Foreign Minister İnönü pointed out that the<br />
military campaign was “a step in the right direction by the international<br />
community in fulfilling its undertakings to protect the civilian<br />
population.” 23<br />
The NATO operation was successful on the Serbian side and forced the<br />
Serbians to come to the negotiating table. Serbian leader Milosevic, Bosnian<br />
leader Izetbegovic and Croat leader Tudjman, as leaders of three groups,<br />
started negotiations under the mediation of the US administration in<br />
Dayton, Ohio on 1 November After two weeks they reached an<br />
agreement on a peace deal stipulating maintenance of the territorial<br />
integrity of Bosnia that would consist of a Bosnian-‐Croat federation and a<br />
Bosnian Serb entity. Turkey did not play a direct role in the negotiations<br />
which were, in fact, brokered by the US. After the conclusion of the<br />
agreement, President Demirel congratulated all three leaders. Turkish<br />
officials stated that the Dayton Peace Agreement was not a perfect one;<br />
however, “under the prevailing circumstances this was the best that<br />
historical opportunity provided.” 24<br />
THE TURKISH PERCEPTION OF THE WAR AND STATE IDENTITY<br />
In the Turkish view, what was happening in Bosnia was a reflection of the<br />
Serbian leadership’s aim of creating ‘Greater Serbia’. Turkey was of the<br />
opinion that Serbia was also trying to take revenge for the conquest of the<br />
Ottomans of that region by killing Bosnian Muslims whom they also called<br />
“Turks”. In fact, the Serbian leadership seemed to hate Bosniaks since they<br />
regarded them as the extension of Ottoman history. The fact that Bosniaks<br />
were, in fact, keeping Turkish culture alive increased that image in view of<br />
the nationalist Serb groups. During the conflict Serbian and Croatian attacks<br />
also damaged some of the buildings and infrastructure that had been<br />
constructed during the Ottoman Empire. One of the best known examples<br />
23 Semih D. İdiz, ‘Bosnia crisis reaches endgame’, Turkish Probe, 1 September , p. 4.<br />
24 Semih D. İdiz, ‘Ank<strong>ara</strong> welcomes peace accord for Bosnia’, Turkish Probe, 24 November<br />
, pp. 7-‐8.<br />
13
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
was the destruction of the bridge in Mostar by the Bosnian Croat forces. In<br />
other words, for Turkey, the war also represented the erasing of the<br />
Ottoman culture in Europe. This was a war not only against Bosnian<br />
Muslims, but also against all Ottoman heritage. 25<br />
Turkish officials were also affected by the fact that Turkey was the only<br />
country that Bosniaks could ask for help. Turkey was the only source of<br />
help for them. Regardless of whether or not Turkey wanted it, they<br />
considered Turkey as their only would-‐be guardian that should provide<br />
protection for them. There was no other country to which they could turn.<br />
The Turkish Foreign Minister stated:<br />
During the Gulf War there were no people who waited for Turkey to<br />
come to their help and who saw Turkey as the only hope for their salvation.<br />
Events did not turn into a massacre. In Bosnia-‐Hercegovina people are<br />
sacrificing everything in order to migrate to Turkey. That was not the case<br />
in Iraq. In Bosnia-‐Hercegovina and Azerbaijan people had hope only from<br />
Turkey. They had millions of relatives in Turkey. They were doing their best<br />
to migrate to where those people were living. 26<br />
Turkish foreign policy during the Bosnian War could be called active<br />
and assertive, since Turkey launched many initiatives to get other countries<br />
and international organizations to act. Turkish attempts were concentrated<br />
on two sides: the Islamic world and the Western world. 27 Concerning<br />
Islamic countries, Turkey used the platform of the OIC by trying to bring all<br />
countries with Muslim populations to adopt the same attitude on the<br />
Bosnian conflict. The extraordinary summit of the OIC in İstanbul in June<br />
was an important early initiative that led to the acceptance of a<br />
common point on the issue. The convening of the Balkan Conference and<br />
the diplomatic initiatives launched at the level of the CSCE, UN and NATO<br />
calling upon them to decide in favour of a military intervention were also<br />
significant activities of Turkey in its attempt to end the bloodshed. Turkey,<br />
in fact, was the only country that from the early phase of the war<br />
consistently insisted on the necessity of a military campaign against Serbian<br />
targets. Ank<strong>ara</strong> emphasized its opinion that only sanctions and diplomatic<br />
measures would not be enough to deter Serbs. The Turkish government<br />
also stated that it was ready to join an international intervention with its<br />
own troops. Some observers even compared the role of Turkey in the<br />
Bosnian crisis to that of the US during the Gulf conflict. In fact the use or<br />
threat of force was not a traditional instrument in Turkish foreign policy.<br />
25 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Ottoman heritage on Turkey’s policy toward<br />
the Balkans please see Şaban H. Çalış, Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler, Neo-‐Osmanlılık,<br />
Özal ve Balkanlar. Konya: Çizgi.<br />
26 Nilüfer Yalçın, ‘Çetin: ‘Derhal uyacağız’ ’, Milliyet, 1 June (Translated from Turkish by<br />
the author)<br />
27 Hasan Ünal, ‘Bosnia II – a Turkish critique’, The World Today, Vol. 51 (), p. <br />
14
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
Turkey has always been cautious toward the use of force except in some<br />
rare circumstances. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy during the Bosnian<br />
problem could be regarded as the most active one since the Cyprus issue in<br />
28<br />
At the time of the Bosnian conflict, Turkish policy makers declared<br />
many times that Turkey was a great country that would follow a leading<br />
and dynamic foreign policy. Since Turkey’s position in the new<br />
international order of the post-‐Cold War era was discussed heavily at the<br />
time, Turkish leaders were insisting on the country’s important role in<br />
world politics. In their view, one should remind the world that Turkey was<br />
still influential and could not just be put aside. In the region extending from<br />
the Adriatic to the Wall of China, it was not possible to wage a war or bring<br />
peace without the support of Turkey. 29<br />
During the Bosnian conflict, thanks to its initiatives Turkey was taken<br />
into consideration. Almost all the actors involved in some kind of<br />
mediation asked for Turkey’s support. Owen-‐Stoltenberg’s visit to Ank<strong>ara</strong>,<br />
the invitation of Turkey to the London Conference, and later Richard<br />
Holbrooke’s contacts in Ank<strong>ara</strong> were important indications that so long as<br />
Turkey launched an active diplomacy, its role in international politics was<br />
appreciated. In other words, as Turkey’s role in regional affairs increased,<br />
Turkey’s position in international politics improved as well.<br />
Moreover, Turkey’s influence in the Balkans was perceived as an<br />
important proof of its claim of being European. Only if it had weight in the<br />
region, it could prove its importance to Europe. If its Bosnian policy failed, it<br />
would mean not just the destruction of an Ottoman heritage, but also the<br />
end of Turkey’s European dream.<br />
The Kurdish question did not appear to play any substantial role in<br />
Turkey’s Bosnian policy since Bosnia was an internationally recognized<br />
country and the violence against it was directed mainly from another state,<br />
Yugoslavia. Although Kurdish nationalism was on the rise in those years<br />
and PKK attacks constituted a major internal problem, Turkey presented<br />
inter-‐group relations in the country as a model to the Balkans. However, it<br />
was also emphasized that if a multi-‐cultural and democratic Bosnia was<br />
created, this would be an example for the solution of Turkey’s own<br />
problem. Meanwhile, some observers stated that it was easier in Turkey to<br />
go to Bosnia than to criticize Turkey’s Kurdish policy.<br />
In sum, arguing that it was a great country interested in its region,<br />
Ank<strong>ara</strong> tried to play a leadership role and assume guardianship of the<br />
Bosniaks. It launched many diplomatic initiatives, but it was careful not to<br />
act alone. It was emphasized by Turkish decision makers many times that<br />
28 Diplomats at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Interview by author, Ank<strong>ara</strong>, January <br />
29 A previous Turkish foreign minister, Interview by author, Ank<strong>ara</strong>, 13 January <br />
15
Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
Turkey would act multilaterally and did not have any neo-‐Ottomanist<br />
dreams. Turkey considered that as long as it could assert its weight in the<br />
Balkan crisis, it would be taken into account by the US, European countries<br />
and international organizations.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
This study analyzed Turkey’s foreign policy during Bosnian War between<br />
‐ Turkish state identity has been discussed heavily in the wake of<br />
the end of the Cold War and alternative identities were proposed instead<br />
especially by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists. As the country’s strategic<br />
role that it acquired during the Cold War was increasingly questioned, there<br />
seemed to be ambiguity regarding the path that Turkish foreign policy<br />
makers would choose. The war in Bosnia started at the very time in which<br />
Turkey was experiencing an identity crisis.<br />
The findings of this study supports the hypothesis that constructivist<br />
approach helps us make sense of Turkey’s Bosnia policy. Turkey tried to<br />
prove that it could still play an important role in its neighborhood,<br />
especially in Europe in the new circumstamces of the post-‐bipolar world<br />
system. Turkey’s Bosnian policy constituted a hallmark because it<br />
represented the most active foreign policy attitude of Ank<strong>ara</strong> since the<br />
Cyprus intervention of Turkey found that as it acted rigorously and<br />
tried to convince international actors to act more assertively, it was<br />
increasingly taken into consideration by the great powers, like the US and<br />
EU. The fact that it started bearing the fruits of its active policy encouraged<br />
Turkey to maintain the intended course.<br />
During the Bosnian war Turkish policymakers stressed the continuing<br />
importance of Turkey for the stability of the neigboring regions. The wars<br />
of Yugoslav dissolution witnessed many narratives of Turkish leaders<br />
declaring the greatness of the country. This dominant narrative was<br />
accompanied by an active foreign policy implemented by the Turkish<br />
leaders ch<strong>ara</strong>cterized by Ank<strong>ara</strong>’s many diplomatic initiatives to bring the<br />
Bosnian issue to the attention of the international community and convince<br />
international actors to take more measures in order to stop the conflict.<br />
This study argued that this discourse and foreign policy were caused by<br />
Turkish leaders’ desire to show Turkey’s still lasting geopolitical signifance<br />
to the world. Related to that they also aimed to maintain the state identity<br />
that Turkey had acquired during the Cold War as part of the Western world.<br />
Turkish policy makers found that as long as they launched initiatives for the<br />
solution of the conflict, they were taken more seriously by the US and other<br />
international actors.<br />
16
Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Bosnian War (‐)<br />
BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
“Bosna’ya silah gönderdik”, Hürriyet, 4 December <br />
BANCHOFF Thomas, “German Identity and European Integration”,<br />
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5 (), p. ‐<br />
CAMPBELL David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the<br />
Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, ), p.<br />
<br />
CHAFETZ Glenn, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, “Introduction:<br />
Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy”, Security Studies,<br />
Vol. 8 (Winter ‐, Spring ), p. VIII-‐XXII.<br />
CHECKEL Jeffrey. T., “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations<br />
Theory”, World Politics, Vol. 50 (), p. ‐<br />
CORNELL Erik, Turkey in the 21st Century, Opportunities, Challenges,<br />
Threats, Britain: Curzon, <br />
ÇAĞLAYAN Selin, “Ank<strong>ara</strong>’nın kâbusu: Balkan Savaşı…”, Hürriyet, 23<br />
November <br />
ÇALIŞ Şaban H., Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler, Neo-‐Osmanlılık, Özal ve<br />
Balkanlar, Konya: Çizgi, <br />
DAĞI İhsan D., “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey:<br />
Rethinking the West and the Westernization”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6<br />
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Western China (Boulder: Westview Press, ).<br />
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24 November , pp. 7-‐8.<br />
İDIZ Semih D., “Bosnia crisis reaches endgame”, Turkish Probe, 1 September<br />
<br />
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Türkiye-‐Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri”, Doğu Batı, IV/14 (), p‐<br />
KOWERT Paul A., “National Identity: Inside and Out”, Security Studies, Vol. 8<br />
(Winter ‐, Spring ), p. 1-‐<br />
KRAMER Heinz, A Changing Turkey, The Challenge to Europe and the United<br />
States, Washington, D. C.: Brookings, <br />
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Makedonya Politikası: ‐”, in Sönmezoğlu (ed.), Türk Dış<br />
Politikasının Analizi.<br />
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Vol. 34 (), p‐<br />
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Identity”, Security Studies, Vol. 8 (Winter ‐, Spring ), p.<br />
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ÖZCAN Gencer, “Doksanlarda Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış<br />
Politikasında Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi”, in G. Özcan and Ş. Kut (eds.),<br />
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Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun<br />
En Uzun On Yıl, Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde<br />
Doksanlı Yıllar, İstanbul: Büke, , p‐<br />
ROBINS Philip, Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold<br />
War, Seattle: University of Washington Press, <br />
SÖNMEZOĞLU Faruk, “Dünya ve Türkiye”, in F. Sönmezoğlu (ed.), Türk Dış<br />
Politikasının Analizi (İstanbul: Der, ), p. ‐<br />
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Ol<strong>ara</strong>k Balkanlar”, in Gencer Özcan & Şule Kut, eds., En Uzun On Yıl<br />
(İstanbul: Boyut, ).<br />
ÜNAL Hasan, “Bosnia II – a Turkish critique”, The World Today, Vol. 51<br />
()<br />
WENDT Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press, <br />
YALÇIN Nilüfer, “Çetin: ‘Derhal uyacağız”, Milliyet, 1 June <br />
YİNANÇ Barçın, “Hiçbirşeyi daha kötü bırakmadım”, Milliyet, 30 July <br />
18
THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF AGRI IN EUROPE’S<br />
SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR<br />
László Marácz *<br />
Özet<br />
Avrupa, enerji açısından neredeyse tamamen kıta dışındaki satıcıl<strong>ara</strong><br />
bağımlıdır. Son zamanlarda Avrupa Birliği (EU), çeşitli ülkelere enerji<br />
bağımlığını azaltmayı baş<strong>ara</strong>madı. Bu durum, Avrupa Birliğini dünya<br />
arenasında jeopolitik bir oyuncu ol<strong>ara</strong>k oldukça savunmasız bırakmıştır.<br />
Özellikle merkezî ve Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri doğalgazlarını Rusya'dan<br />
sağladıkları için neredeyse tamamen onl<strong>ara</strong> bağlımlıdır. <strong>Merkezi</strong> ve Avrupa<br />
kıtasındaki bazı ülkeler bu durumunu değiştirmeye çalışmaktadırlar.<br />
Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Romanya, Nisan ayında Rusya'yı atlay<strong>ara</strong>k<br />
Hazar Denizi yoluyla K<strong>ara</strong>deniz'den Avrupa'ya doğalgazı taşımak için<br />
anlaştılar. Bu yıliçinde Macaristan da AGRI adlı konsorsiyuma katıldı. Sonuç<br />
ol<strong>ara</strong>k, AB üye ülkeler, Rus kontrolündeki doğalgaz boru hatlarına daha az<br />
bağımlı olacak.<br />
Anahtar Kelimeler: Enerji çeşitliliği, AGRI, LNG, K<strong>ara</strong>deniz, Jeopolitik.<br />
Abstract<br />
Europe is almost completely dependent for her energy on outside suppliers. In<br />
recent years the European Union (EU) has not succeeded in reducing the<br />
energy dependencies by diversification, a keyword in European strategic<br />
papers (see, COM final). This makes the European Union as a<br />
geopolitical player in the world arena rather vulnerable. Especially the<br />
countries in Central and Eastern Europe are almost completely dependent for<br />
their gas supplies on Russia. Some countries in the Central and European space<br />
are trying to modify this state of affairs. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania have<br />
agreed upon in April of this year to transport gas from the Caspian Sea via the<br />
Black Sea to Europe bypassing Russia. Later this year Hungary also has joined<br />
this so-‐called AGRI consortium. As a result, EU-‐member states will be less<br />
dependent on the gas pipelines that are carrying Russian gas through states<br />
that are under Russian control.<br />
Keywords: Energy diversification, AGRI, LNG, Black Sea, geopolitics<br />
EU-‐RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN ENERGY POLITICS<br />
Russia is intrinsically involved in the EU debate on energy security.<br />
According to Richard Youngs, Russia ‘completely dominates (…) debates<br />
over European energy policy (see Youngs , 79).’ Russia is the main<br />
* Assist. Prof. Dr., University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Humanities, European Studies,<br />
University of Amsterdam, l.k.m<strong>ara</strong>[email protected]<br />
K<strong>ara</strong>deniz Araştırmaları • Kış • Sayı 28 • ‐28
László Marácz<br />
actor engaged in the issue of supply. As one of the largest global suppliers of<br />
natural gas and oil, Russia can meet high European demands for energy.<br />
Due to its geographical proximity to the Union, the country’s energy giant,<br />
the state-‐owned company Gazprom is also an obvious partner for European<br />
state members’ energy providers. Russia on the other hand benefits from<br />
these European revenues. One fifth of its annual GDP income is derived<br />
from energy revenues (Godzimirski ). However, political unrest in the<br />
post-‐Soviet space can endanger reliable supply to Europe, as has happened<br />
several times in recent years. Having toppled the communist system only<br />
two decades ago, Russia remains an unstable partner in energy negotiations<br />
(Correlje and Van der linde ). In efforts to place Russia’s pipeline<br />
network under multilateral regulations failed when Russia refused to ratify<br />
the Energy Charter Treaty (Youngs , 80). To prevent further upheavals<br />
and ensure energy security, the EU established a Common Economic Space<br />
(CES) with Russia at a summit in St. Petersburg in The long-‐term goal<br />
of the agreement is the formation of an open market between EU and<br />
Russia.<br />
Europe’s demand for gas is high, however, and Russia can meet this<br />
demand like no other actor on the market (Progress Report ). Europe<br />
will not be able therefore to exclude Russia from gas deals. Maintaining<br />
good relations with Russia is a prerogative. By creating a more formal<br />
cooperation basis with Russia, EU can, however, avoid becoming a victim of<br />
the sort of unpredictable reactions the Ukraine has had to put up with<br />
regularly. Signed contracts can ensure EU energy safety and reasonable<br />
prices for Russian gas. The Common Economic Space between EU and<br />
Russia provides a framework to establish legally binding documents on gas<br />
deals.<br />
Energy related issues form the “backbone’’ of CES (see Sutela ,<br />
14). Due to asymmetrical provisions in supply and demand between the<br />
Union and Russia several gas disputes have had to be solved during the last<br />
years (see Progess Report ). Russia has turned out to be a politically<br />
unreliable partner in gas supply. Following political rows with<br />
neighbouring states Russia has regularly turned off the gas tap thereby<br />
hindering transit to Europe. During the Russian war with Georgia in ,<br />
following price disputes with Ukraine in (Stern, ; Youngs )<br />
and as a reaction to failed debt payments by Ukraine in (Pirani et al.<br />
), Russia demonstrated its power by causing severe gas shortages in<br />
Central and Eastern Europe following the pipeline cuts. As a consequence,<br />
EU and Russia agreed on an Early Warning Mechanism in to prevent<br />
further crises leaving EU countries at the mercy of Russian gas magnates<br />
(EU press release, ).<br />
European energy security is highly dependent on diplomatic relations<br />
with Russia and joint ventures between European and Russian energy<br />
20
The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor<br />
companies. The foremost objective of Union’s energy policy is to secure<br />
supply. As a ‘net energy importer’ (COM final) Europe is exposed<br />
to energy supply shocks, price volatility and decreasing fossil fuel reserves.<br />
Indigenous energy production covers barely half of Europe’s need, with 56<br />
percent of European energy imported from third countries. In fact,<br />
domestic production even started declining in (COM final).<br />
If this trend is not reversed, fuel imports will rise even further in the future.<br />
Oil and gas, i.e. 60 and 26 percent in respectively, compromise the<br />
largest share (COM final). Russia provided 36 percent of oil<br />
imports in (Europe’s Energy Position, , 21) and 42 percent of gas<br />
import in (COM final), rendering the EU highly dependent<br />
on Russian resources. Even if substantial increase in Russian energy<br />
supplies is achieved until twenty percent ‘energy imports [are] set to<br />
rise under almost all scenarios’ (COM final, 3).<br />
THE GREAT PIPELINE RACE<br />
The European Union has not succeeded in developing a common energy<br />
strategy, nor a strategy of energy diversification. There is a lot of talking<br />
about the EU’s sponsored Nabucco-‐pipeline that should carry gas from<br />
Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region via the Caucasus and Turkey to<br />
Europe thereby bypassing Russia and Ukraine but concrete steps to<br />
construct the pipeline have not been taken so far. It is extremely unlikely<br />
that the Nabucco project will be operative in as has been planned.<br />
Without a common energy policy and a succesfull strategy of energy<br />
diversification the EU will hardly become a major political player in the<br />
21th century.<br />
Europe is linked to the Russian gas fields by several large gas pipelines,<br />
like the North Stream. More gas pipeline routes, like South Stream will be<br />
planned in the near future and can be considered as a concurrent to the<br />
Nabucco pipeline in the southern gas corridor. These pipelines and projects<br />
are controlled or will be controlled by the Russians or will run through<br />
countries, like Belarus or Ukraine that are politically controlled by Russia.<br />
Also some richer countries in the Western part of Europe, like Germany<br />
have reached an agreement with Russia on the supply of gas. Russian gas<br />
will be carried by pipelines that run directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea,<br />
the so-‐called North Stream. North Stream is cooperation between the state-‐<br />
owned Russian company Gazprom, the German energy companies seafoodplus.info and<br />
BASF and the Dutch Gasunie. Poland is excluded from this pipeline and the<br />
Russian-‐German cooperation has been interpreted in Poland as a modern<br />
Molotov-‐Ribbentrop Pact referring to the Sovjet-‐Nazi pact preceding the<br />
Second World War that determined the tragic faith of Poland and the other<br />
Central and Eastern European countries during and after the Second World<br />
War.<br />
21
László Marácz<br />
In the past Russia has successfully played EU members off against the<br />
others. The EU treats energy policy as a foreign policy issue, an area<br />
member states like to protect from too much interference from Brussels<br />
(Youngs ). By signing bilateral agreements with major national energy<br />
providers such as German seafoodplus.info, Italian ENI and French EDF, Russian energy<br />
giant Gazprom has managed to become a direct stakeholder in the largest<br />
national gas markets in Europe (Leal-‐Arcas ). Other competeting non-‐<br />
EU gas suppliers to the EU, such as Algeria and Libya that are active on the<br />
Italian market, have been made business partners by the Russians in an<br />
attempt to monopolize gas supply into the EU. The Lisbon Treaty added a<br />
clausal on energy solidarity amongst the EU-‐members. The clausal has no<br />
legal binding, however and is not being obeyed (Progress Report, ).<br />
Companies like seafoodplus.info, ENI and EDF are therefore helping Russia along in<br />
gaining a gas monopoly.<br />
Hence, Russia has used its monopoly position as a real geopolitical<br />
weapon that can be employed for ‘divide and rule’ tactics. Austria, Hungary<br />
and Serbia could not resist the temptation and were willing to accept the<br />
offer of Gazprom to buy shares in their local energy companies, i.e. Austrian<br />
OMV, Hungarian MOL and Sebian NIS to bind them to the South Stream<br />
project. Russian energy company Surgutneftegas has acquired percent<br />
stake in Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, although MOLs constitution<br />
allows only for a foreign stake of 10 percent. This deal violating Hungarian<br />
law was concluded by the pro-‐Russian, oligarchic government of Prime<br />
Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany who was lobbying for the position of<br />
‘commissioner of the South Stream project’ and made Hungary completely<br />
dependent on Russian interest. Recently the new Hungarian centre-‐right<br />
government under Viktor Orbán declared by his spokesman Tamás Fellegi,<br />
Hungary’s National Development Minister that the state wants to increase<br />
its leverage in the energy sector and does not welcome foreign stakeholders<br />
in strategic national companies (See seafoodplus.info). It will be not easy to get<br />
rid of the Russian stake in the MOL company, however. Gazprom was able<br />
to buy the Serbian state energy company NIS for almost nothing and also<br />
acquired the control of pipelines on Serbian territory giving the Serbs the<br />
gu<strong>ara</strong>ntee that South Stream will be running over Serbian territory. In the<br />
end South Stream will reach Silvio Berlusconi’s Italy who is a frequent guest<br />
in the Kremlin and a strong supporter of Russian exclusive energy interest<br />
in Europe (see Lucas ).<br />
In order to break the exclusive dependency on Russia gas that is not<br />
only the gas itself but also the routes carrying the gas to the Union the EU<br />
has launched several projects to diversify the routes. The best-‐known<br />
pipeline project in the southern gas corridor is the already mentioned<br />
Nabucco that will carry gas over the territory of Turkey. But several other<br />
smaller projects, such as the Trans-‐Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), the Turkey-‐<br />
22
The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor<br />
Greece-‐Italy Interconnector (ITGI) or the Azerbaijan-‐Georgia-‐Romania<br />
Interconnector (AGRI) all have the potential to be an important element of<br />
the southern gas corridor and even call into question the future of Nabucco<br />
itself. In any case, all these pipelines will draw gas from the same gas fields,<br />
i.e. Sah-‐Deniz 1-‐2 in the Caspian Sea region.<br />
European pipeline project Nabucco has been undercut several times by<br />
the Russians. Under Ference Gyurcsány’s pro-‐Russian government in <br />
Hungary signed a bilateral deal with Gazprom to receive gas via the Russian<br />
pipeline Blue Stream (Youngs ). Due to this deal Hungary temporary<br />
withdraw from EUs Nabucco pipeline project triggering criticism from<br />
Brussels (see Aczél ). In Russia signed deals with Azerbaijan,<br />
securing gas supplies to stream to Russia instead of through the delayed<br />
Nabucco pipeline (Socor ).<br />
Furthermore, Russian pipeline project South Stream will form a direct<br />
rival supply route to Nabucco as it also carries gas to Southern Europe<br />
(Finon ). With French EDF and Italian ENI financing the rival, it is hard<br />
to take Europe seriously in its attempts at solidarity. South Stream will<br />
bypassing Romania and cuts through Bulgaria playing off Romania and<br />
Bulgaria against the other. This is one of the main reasons Romania has<br />
been initiating AGRI bypassing Russia in order to gu<strong>ara</strong>ntee itself a place<br />
within the South Stream project.<br />
RUSSIAN GAS MONOPOLY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE<br />
As mentioned above Russia has an important share in the energy supply of<br />
the European Union. Especially the countries in Central and Eastern Europe<br />
are almost completely dependent upon Russian gas. Slovakia is depending<br />
for 99 percent, the Czech Republic for 78 percent, Hungary for 80 percent,<br />
Poland for 67 percent and the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania<br />
for percent on Russian gas. The only exception in Central and Eastern<br />
Europe is Romania that satisfies 85 percent of her gas demands from<br />
internal resources. Furthermore, in these countries the connecting<br />
pipelines to Russia run over Ukrainian territory, i.e. in the case of Slovakia,<br />
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Greece, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania<br />
and Russia or Russian controlled countries like Belarus in the case of the<br />
Baltic countries (compare Marácz , 17).<br />
The Russians are very well aware of this and have used the energy<br />
weapon against those who are critical about present day Russia. The small<br />
Baltic countries can be blackmailed by threatening to cut off energy<br />
supplies from Russia. In recent winters Russia was not ready to deliver gas<br />
to Ukraine of president Viktor Yushchenko who was conducting a pro-‐<br />
Western policy. After the election in February of this year that was<br />
won by the pro-‐Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine does not<br />
23
László Marácz<br />
have to be afraid that they will be cut off from Russian energy supplies. The<br />
government of Yanukovych will support Russian politics led by Putin and<br />
Medvedev in exchange for lower energy, especially gas prices that will keep<br />
the Yanukovych government longer in power.<br />
Gazprom, Russia’s state-‐owned sole exporter of Russian gas has not<br />
only succeeded in attaining large shares of European energy firms it also<br />
holds long-‐term supply contracts with European distributors (Dreyer<br />
). In the cases of Slovakia and Bulgaria, where one distributor<br />
dominates the entire market for gas (Stern ) consumers are <br />
percent dependent on Russian supplies. The Baltic states are also highly<br />
dependent on Russian gas with Gazprom holding a 37 percent stake in Eesti<br />
Gaas (Stern , ), Estonia’s gas monopoly. These European bilateral<br />
ventures with Russian state-‐owned gas company Gazprom undermine EU<br />
attempts to speak with one voice and to take up seriously the issue of<br />
energy diversification. As some EU-‐members rely on only one supplier, i.e.<br />
the Baltic states on Russia securing supplies entails lowering dependency<br />
on these suppliers by diversifying the sources. The Union’s strategy seems<br />
to construct ‘reliable framework conditions’ to realize this diversification<br />
(COM final, 5). Priority infrastructure projects aimed at<br />
interlinking European energy markets and subsequently decreasing their<br />
dependence on third countries is listed under this point. Projects include<br />
the ‘Baltic Interconnection Plan’ which entails key infrastructures necessary<br />
for effective interconnection of the Baltic region with the rest of the EU and<br />
the ‘southern gas corridor’ interconnections to link gas supply from Caspian<br />
and Middle eastern sources and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) develop LNG<br />
action plan on liquefaction and storage facilities. One of these latter projects<br />
is AGRI.<br />
THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF AGRI<br />
As we have discussed above especially the countries between Germany and<br />
Russia in the Central and Eastern European zone are worried about their<br />
energy supplies that is strongly connected to their security and safety. To<br />
retake the initiative three presidents, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham<br />
Aliyev, the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili and the Romanian<br />
President Trajan Basescu met in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku on 14 September<br />
of this year and signed the Baku decl<strong>ara</strong>tion in which the three heads of<br />
state decided to construct a gas pipeline that will connect the three<br />
countries. The construction of the pipeline labeled AGRI which is the<br />
abbreviation of ‘Azerbaijan-‐Georgia-‐Romania-‐Interconnection’ will connect<br />
these countries via the Black Sea. The Georgian president Saakashvili who<br />
is clearly on the side of the West and would like his country to join NATO<br />
has played a crucial role in setting up AGRI. With the help of the AGRI<br />
24
The Strategic Relevance of AGRI in Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor<br />
project Saakashvili himself is using energy as a geopolitical weapon against<br />
Russia trying to embarrass the Russians at their own playing field.<br />
AGRI will draw gas from the Caspian Sea that will be carried via a<br />
pipeline across land to Georgia for liquefaction. This process of liquefaction<br />
will take place in a plant for LNG exports at the Azerbaijan-‐owned oil export<br />
terminal of Kulevi in Georgia. Kulevi is by the way at “spitting distance”<br />
from the breakaway autonomous territory Abkhazia. Abkhazia is a<br />
marionette state of Russia and is providing Russia a stronger geopolitical<br />
position in the southern part of the Caucasus to put pressure on the AGRI<br />
project. Commentators are afraid that this will make the AGRI project<br />
vulnerable indeed. Further transport of LNG will take place via tankers<br />
from the Georgian port of Poti to the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanta.<br />
In Constanta a terminal will be constructed for the re-‐gasification of the<br />
LNG. The gas will be pumped through Romanian’s pipeline system to<br />
Hungary and to the rest of the Balkans and the European Union.<br />
The Romanian President Traian Basescu has declared that the project<br />
will be set in motion by all means but that he is hoping for financial support<br />
from Brussels. An advantageous moment for this is the coming year <br />
because in the first half year Hungary will chair the Union and afterwards<br />
Poland. The latter country is strongly supporting the Eastern Partnership to<br />
establish all sorts of ties in the post-‐Soviet space having Georgia and<br />
Azerbaijan among its members. Basescu is counting on support from<br />
Hungary where recent elections in April have been won with a<br />
landslide by the pro-‐Western, centre-‐right coalition led by Viktor Orbán.<br />
This coalition took the government position of the Hungarian socialist party<br />
MSZP, an ardent supporter of Gazprom policy. On September 20 Hungary<br />
even announced it would become a shareholder in AGRI project. Now the<br />
following state energy companies, i.e. Romanian Romgaz, Georgian Oil and<br />
Gas Corporation (GOGC), the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic and<br />
the Hungarian Magyar Villamos Müvek Zrt. each holds a 25 percent stake in<br />
the project. Interestingly the Hungarian government had to leave out the<br />
MOL company because a Russian company has a stake in MOL, otherwise<br />
the Russians would have entered the AGRI project through the backdoor.<br />
AGRI will carry eight billion cubic metres gas a year (bcm/year) to<br />
Europe. Compared to the planned 38 bcm/year of Nabucco this is a rather<br />
modest figure. AGRIs capacity will be about five times less than Nabucco’s.<br />
The figure is indeed rather modest when we take into account the yearly<br />
LNG-‐import of a country like France that is about twice as much as the 8<br />
bcm/year that is planned by AGRI. The project financing will require a<br />
relatively modest amount of money of 4-‐6 billion euro. These figures can be<br />
lifted quite easily as demands will increase, however. In speeding up the<br />
distribution possibilities of AGRI to Central Europe and the Balkans the<br />
interconnecting pipeline between Hungary and Romania has already been<br />
25
László Marácz<br />
constructed. On October 14 of this year the gas pipeline linking the<br />
Romanian city of Arad and the Hungarian city of Szeged making the<br />
distribution of AGRI gas to Central Europe possible has been opened. It is<br />
also one of the first gas pipelines running ‘north-‐south’ in the Central and<br />
Eastern European area. The opening was attended by European<br />
commissioner for energy, Günther Oettinger who announced that pipelines<br />
running ‘north-‐south’ on the territory of the Union, like the Arad-‐Szeged<br />
pipe line and their connections to the north will be sponsored by the<br />
European Commission. North-‐south pipelines play an important role in the<br />
energy security of the Union.<br />
EU-‐projects in the southern energy corridor are strengthened by a<br />
decision of the European Commission to establish a Danube Region in order<br />
to interconnect a geopolitical territorial unit, a European macro-‐region<br />
through which the Danube river is flowing consisting of Germany, Austria,<br />
the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, the<br />
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine – six of which are EU Member States, and<br />
in a broader territorial context the region also comprises the Czech<br />
Republic, Slovenia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro. Concerning<br />
Germany and Ukraine only the regions have been invited that are crossed<br />
by the Danube, like the German federal states Baden-‐Württenberg and<br />
Bavaria. By doing so it is prevented that Germany with its enormous<br />
economic power would dominate the Danube strategy (European<br />
Özet Osmanlı Devleti’nin, idari, sosyal ve ekonomik yapısı ile ilgili verileri kapsaması bakımından tahrir defterleri mevcut arşiv kaynakları içerisinde ayrı bir öneme sahiptir. Tahrir Defterleri ışığında Osmanlı Devleti’nin pek çok şehri sosyo‐ekonomik yapı bakımından incelenmiştir. Tahrir defterleri çerçevesinde Anadolu’nun çeşitli şehir ve sancaklarını çalışan araştırmacıların hem fikir olduğu konu yüzyıl Anadolu’sunda bir nüfus artışı yaşandığıdır. Genel itibariyle araştırmacıların ekseriyeti, çalıştıkları bölgelerdeki nüfusun yüzyıl içerisinde iki katına çıktığını ifade etmekte ve aşırı bir nüfus artışından bahsetmektedir. Mevcut nüfus artışına karşın, Türkiye sınırları içinde kalan bölgeler için yapılmış olan tahrir çalışmalarında, demografik yapının açıklanması açısından çok önemli olan, Osmanlı/Anadolu dışından yada içinden gelen ve nüfus artışına katkı yapan göç konusu ya hiç incelenmemiş ya da istatistiklere yer verilmeden sadece bir iki paragraf bahsedilerek geçiştirilmiştir. Tahrir Defterlerinde mevcut dış göç verileri arasında şarkî, şarkiyân ya da şarklu şeklinde geçen kayıtlar dikkat çekmektedir. Tahrir Defterlerinde geçen şark kavramının ne olduğu münferit bir çalışma yapılmadığından dolayı tam olarak açıklığa kavuşturulamamıştır. Tahrir Defterleri ekseninde yapacağımız bu çalışmada, Orta ve Doğu Anadolu’da mevcut 50’den fazla şehir yada kasaba merkezine ait veriler çerçevesinde şark tabirinin ne anlam ifade ettiği ortaya konulmaya ve bu veriler dış göç bağlamında değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Tahrir Defterleri, Yüzyıl, Göç, Safevi, Osmanlı. Abstract Tahrir Registers have an important place within the present archive sources as they include the information about governmental, economic and social structure of Ottoman Empire. In the light of tahrir registers, many cities of Ottoman Empire have been scrutinized. The issue about which researschers ,who work on various cities and counties, agree in the frame of Tahrir registers is that there appeared a population increase in the 16th century Anatolia. Generally, most of the researchers state that, in the places they worked in this century, the population increased twofold, and they mention about an excessive population increase. Despite this existing population increase , in the tahrir studies which were done for the areas within the borders of Turkey, the migration, which has an important place from the aspect of explaining the demographic structure, which is inside or outside of Ottoman/Anatolia and contributing the population increase, either has never been scrutinized, or have been procrastinated by mentioning about it just two paragraphs without showing any statistics. In the Tahrir registers, within the existing information about migration, the records such as şarki, şarkiyan or şarklu take attention. What the concept of şark is within the Tahrir registers has not been explained exactly since there isn’t any discrete study about it. In this study, which will be done in the frame of tahrir registers, what the term şark means will be tried to revealed in the light of information which more than fifty city or town centre existing in Middle and East Anatolia and this information will be evaluated in the context of migration. Key words: Tahrir Registers, 16th century, Migration, Safevi, Otoman.